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The Failure of the Socialist Party and the

WHEN

the Sochlit Labor Party split in 1900-190 1, and gave
bxth to the Socialist Party, this was a progreirsive development.
The Socialist Lsbr Party, although some twenty-three yeam in the
field, had not been able to root itself firmly among the American
r n w . It remained a skeleton organization of the foreign-barn,
and its prop- and activities had little immediate relation to the lift
of the native workers. The main cause of this was ita narrow
,I sectarian policy, especially in the previous ten years under the leadership of Daniel Dc Leon.
In 1900, capitalism was undergoing a very rapid expansion. The
a
. working class was also griming swiftly and its grievances and srruggles WEIE multigying. There was an urgent need for a better organization of the workers' struggles, econornidy and phicnlly, in the
light of a revolutionary goal for the working d9ss. In rhi sintation,
breaking through the hard sectarian shell of the Sodalist Labor
Party, the Socialist Party came into exisrence.
Great
were placed in the new orgmization by the bulk
of the n v o l u elements
~
of the time. And during the oncoming
years these rcvoluhnary foms put forth the moart intern# efforts t o
strengthen the party. Many thousands of workers made tbt building
of the Socialise Party their He's work.
struggled and fought
for it, and prcpard llnd distributed
of p r o p p & . At times it
lmked as though their'effatts would succeed, for the SDeialist Party
p a d d y grew in membership and intlutnee, It apptared that the
American party would be able to progress as fast as the =idly growW
ing Socialist Partks in other &dist
wuntrks.
But since the formation of the s o d k t Party th'kty-five years
have p e d , and what do we see? The Sodalist Partp, into which so
much devoted work was put, b today small, stagnant and weak; in
fact, is mually dedining hth in organizational strength and irrflucnce.
In 1903, the Sacialist Party had 15,970 memhrs, and in 1935 it
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had 19,12 1 or just about the number it started with a generation
before, and it is now rapidly ldng membership. The So&h Partg's
vote in 1932 was 883,342, or less than the 897,O 11 which it polled
in 1912. Twenv-five years ago the Party's trade union intluence a h
was many times greater than it is at the present time. The Party has
long since lost its &gle representative in Congr~ss,And so it is on
all fronts: stagnation and decline. T o cap the dimax, the Socialist
Party $ now undergoing a nationaI split which has thrown the Party
into confusion, is musing it a heavy 10s in m e m W p , and is g n eraIly creating a critical situation.
Obviously, the Socialist Party, l i e the Sockfist Labor Party before
it, has failed. That is the meaning of its present crisis. The Socialist
Party has not been the means of winning the American masses
ideologicalty for socialism nor of providing them with the necessary
effectme politid organimtion. The reality of the failure of the Sod h t Party is emphasized by the very existence of the Communist
Party. It was only bemuse the Socialist Party did not function as an
effective revolutionarp organization of the American working d m
that the Communist Parry came into being.

,
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It is a perthenr question to ask why this miserable showing of
the Socialist Party over so many years? Xs this the best that could
have been done for socialism in the greatest caP;&
countrg in the
world? The workers have the right to a correct answer to thk
question. No party can claim the sole right to carry the banner of
mdalism unless it can effectively defend it. SeE4ticism is a cardinal
Leninist h e and the Sadist Party has great need at present to
practice it. T h e lesw,m m be learned should be helpful in bringing
the S o d k t Party out of its present serious crisis.
The customary explanation for the inahlility of the S d i s t Party
to grow is that it was kcause of the great objective dfimlries in the
United States that it had to contend with. Thcre is much merit in
this contention; but as we shall see, it does not explain basidly the
failure of the Socialist Partv.
Among the b!g obje&e factors militating against the development of class consdousneas among the workers md the building of a
revolutionary
. party
- - in the United States were la) the odstence of
plentiful government free land during several &erations;' (b) the
4
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traditionally higher wage and f i g standards; (c) the development
of a large and consemtiye labor d s t o c r q made up principally of
Amerian-born workers; (d) the pmence of millions of Iow-paid
disfranchkd immigrant workers of various nationalities, languages,
religions and traditions; It)the passge of Iarge numbers of workers
inta the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie and many even h t o the big
bourgeoisie during the long period of i n d d expnsion; (f) the
existence of a relatively high degree of the formal democratic righs
of free speech, free press, free assembly, to organize and strike, to
be elected to any office, the fiction of legalized social equal*, etc.,
which were won by the toilers many years before in the early stages
of the bourgeois revolution and which no longer served as major
issues of immediate p o l i d suvggte (as, for emmple, they did
in Germany, Austria and otber European countries).
These many economic, political and s a d factors undoubtedly
tended powerfully to blur cIass hes, to create bourgeois property
illusions among the warkers, and to prevent their independent political
orgahtion as a h. But they did not d e the d m struggle
altogether. Far from it. The American working mmes bitterly
resented the brutal and ferocious exploitation to which they were
subjected, and they resolutely fought against it. This is amply &own
by their long history of determined trade union smgglcs. Prior to
the great war no country in the world excepc tsarist Russia had such
a record of violent and fiercely fought strikes as the United States,
The workers' strong cIass instinct and fighting trade union spirit were
the raw material out of which a red revoluthnarp party could hhve
been buk. Not as big a party perhaps as in some European countries, yet certainly a strong, healthy, growing organization. But the
Socialst Party proved glaringly incapable of educating these dh
contented masses, of raising their struggle from the economic to the
political sphere, and of building a strong party from their ranb. It is
our task to learn the reasons why.
When the Socialist P a q broke through the crust of bidkt
Labor Pariy sectarianism and took up its work of education and
organidon it found indeed a very hard probhm before it; one more
difiicult in fact than that faced by the k d h t Prarry in any major
capitalkc country. The working d w in the grip of a tremendous

1

rulimg dam propgaada, was thoroughly saturatesl with =pa'&
~usions;the trade unions were already in the hands of the deeply I
r e m * k~p e r s clique; the great mass of workers were still
tied to the two big capid& parties. Therefme, the most elementary
work of enlightenment and organization stmi before the Party.
r
In, this Wcult .situation, in order to grow and to put itself af
the head of these backward mwsq dominated by nithless capitalist
enemies, the Sockhit Party had boldly to d e the great problems
'I
of m a s eduation, organization and smggle confronting it. Ir had
,
to militantly wrest the leadership of the rnout of the hands of
the capitalists and their labor agents. It had to be a fighting party, a
p q of d m t p r o l e h class struggle.
This meant that to develop such a policy of Marxian class struggle, the Socialist Party had to fulfil two major gad basic conditions:
(1) to give active political leadership to the workers in their every- ,
day ftghm for immediate and burning economic and pIiticd demands; and (2) systematidly to educate its own membership and
mass following in the principles of M a d Socialism. Only in this
manner could the Socialist Party come fornard as the real vangwdi
of the workers in the class struggle and at the same h e build ug
a strong body of revalutionq fighters to serve as the very foundation and structure of the P q and all i@ work
The validity of such a policy of Mamian class struggle is demon- .
strated by the whole hktory of the American labor movement. Nor
organization can makc headway against the powerful Amerim capitalist class without an - h e ,
fighting plicy. For example, thc I
trade unions have always grown most in their penbds of greatest
militancy, and stagnated rnw in their p e r i d of intensest b col.laboration. Recent expressions of this truth were the rapid expamion
af thc trade unions during the great strike wave of 1933-1 934, and,
thc paralyzing decay that set in among them during the ptriod of
widespread class .collaboration in the so-called good times from
1923 to 1929.
Another elementary proof of the effectiveness and correctness of
the policy of class struggle is furnished by the growth of the Communist Party in numbers and Mucnce. Although the Communist Prrrtg
is only half as old as the Socialist Party it has about four times ss
many members, It is also unified and hedthp, while the S d i s t Party
is torn with factionalism. The Communist Party, moreover, has had
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to face far greater pccsecution &an was ever the msc with the Socialist Party, exemplified by the Palmer Red raids in which thousands
were arrested, wholesale txpulsions from the trade unions and industries by reactionary American Federation of Labor Icaders, violent
attach by the capitalist press, government d e p r m b n s , etc. The
growth of the Communist Party in the face of these difficulties 59 to
be ascribed to its brave and tirelcirs class struggle plicy.
Still another demonstration of the correctntss of tbe daas struggle
policy is provided by the hiswry of the Socialist Party itself. The best
periods df growth of the &ist
Pareg were dY
thase in which
its policies, hcauw of Left wing presure, took on more of a class
smuggle character (thus 1907-19 121, and it was exactly during
thm periods in which the Socialist Party plunged most deeply into
dass collaboration (for example, 1923-1932) that the Party was
w e a k a and least effective in the class m~~ld.
From d this we are led directly to &
; principal =use of the
Socialkt Partp's failure historically. This W u r e was mwd precisely
by the fact that, except upon rare occasions, the S&t
Party has
not carried on a poliG of-&a struggie. O n tbc contrary, its &a&t
i
0
4 course has been one of opprtuism, of reformism, of elass
collaboration. Throughout its history the Socialist Party has flagrantly
violated the two fundamentals necessary to the development of the
Marxian
struggle policy required for the building of a revolutionary party in the given Amerian conditions, That is, ( I ) it has
not come forward as the militant leader of the toiling m
s in
heir daity struggle over urgent economic and politidcal&cs, but,
insread, has systematically evaded assuming such leadership; (2)
it has not gtriven to build up a strong body of revolutiarq Marxian
understanding among the Party membership and mass following,
but, on the contrary, has dtfiDittly hindered and checked the growth

of such revolutionaq education.
The reformist, opportunist policy which tiq Socialist Party has
traditionalIy followed was the natural consequence of the composition
of its decisive leading forces. From its inception, tbe !
h
i
& Party
attracted many elements of the city petty bourgeoisie who were
feeling acutely the pPtesureof the trusts upon the middle dass and
who had no faith in the two oId parties, but who in no sense were
M d n revoIutionaries. Hence the Party became infested with a
horde of lawyers, doctors, preachers, professom, journalists, small

busintswnen, with an oc-ond
"millionaire" Socialist thrown in.
and very energetic, soon arrived at complete
domination over the P q .
These people, the HIVquits, Bergers, Worh, Wallings, Sprga,
R u d , Myers, Waylands, Simons, Harrimans, Bensons, Stokes, etc.,
etc., were not revolutionists. They were radicals, the Left wing of
the petty bourgeoisie which was being crushed by monopoly capital
and which had no party of its own. Over and above mere wordy
a e r e n c t s between them, the decisive idea mimating them all was to
build the So&t
Party into a sort of progrekve-populist party. T o
thh end they advocated opportunist policies of government and
municipal ownership of industry and various minor legislative reforms, with the general idea of some day transforming capitaJism
into s o c through
~
a peaceful process of the workers voting
tbemselves into power and then legally buying out the industries.
The general conception of rhc ~ o l e ~ i a trole
' s by these middle
class elements was to serve as an instrument of the petty bourgeoisie
in its fight for self-preservation against the advancing big capitalists.
T o them the
struggle of the workers was eswntidy something
foreign, something, at best, that they only had a dillttante interest in
and which, at worst, was a danger to their vote-catching and c b
cohhration schemes. C o v e n d y , the middle class, intellectual
leaders of the Party throughout its history played down every
manifestation of working class fighting spirit, And all the way along
through the y e m they distorted or suppressed the teaching of Marxism to the Party membprs and following and used their own power
to check the development of, and even to drive out of the Party in
thousands, the very revolutionarp elements without whom the Party
auld not possibly be b d t , the Left wing af the Party.
The general result of these long-.continued ref ormist, non-revolutionary policies was to make it impomie to build the Socialist
Party
productinto
of asuch
strong,
a history
revoIutiomq
Es the presentday
organhion.weak
The and
natural
stagmt
end-

And thq, extra-vocal

Socialist Party.

I
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A Generation of Reformism and Its
Disastrous Effects
1 . THE
SOCIALIST
PARTY'SFA~LURE
TO ASSUME

MASSLEADERSHIP

O W let us look briefly at the record of the Socialist Party and see
concretely h o w it has prsistenrly and flagrantly viohted t h e two
main essentials of the Mandan class struggle policy necessary for
the building of a revolutionary party in the specific American condition& namely, the development of the Party as the actual leader
of the maws in the Jaily struggle and the cultivation of Marxian
principles among the Party membership and mass following. W e
will take up the former essentiaI first. Our summary of the Socialist Party's experiences in this connection makes no pretense at
being a complete hktory of the Party. AIl it does is to indicate some
of the main opportunist errors of the Party and the lessons to be
drawn from them. The period covered extends from the foundation
of the Party in 1901 down to the Socialist Party convention of
1934. As for the prtsent tendencies of the Socialist Party, I shaIl
discuss them in a later chapter.

A . Passivity i
Strikes a d 0th Stmggles
When the Socialist Party was formed the trade unions were
already in the hands of the Gompem machine. T h e reactionary
trade union leJ e r s did not carry on a campaign to organize the mass
of the unorganized, but instead confined their efXorts chiefly to the
narrow fringe of skilled workers. Many of these leaders were ~10thful, inefficient, self-seeking, corrupt, and tied up with all kinds of
capitalist organizations. They were open ,defenders of the capitalist
system, worked hand in glove with the two capitalist parties and
generally acted as is brake upon the development of the workers'

dass struggle.
In such a situation it was maniftstly the task and duty of the
9

, b d k t P~;zrto do everything within its p o ~ t &&w
and
give Wd hdtrship to thc immcdiatc struggles of the worken,
@c*ly
on the trade union field. This dws not mean that the
h i d k t Party s h d d bavt u n d u t h to take the place of the trade
d o n % but it sbould have sought to invigorate them, to cxtend
their strikes, to strcngthen their organization campigns and gene d y to give practical leadership to their struggle, as against the
reactionary policies of the Gompers madine.
This aggressive policy offered a high road to e5ective mass leadership by the Party. But such a course was alien to the nature m d
policies of the Socialist Party pctty-bourgeois leaders. They neither
saw the historic task before the Party nor had the impulse to carry
it out. They conceived thc Party principally m be a propaganda organimjon, a movement to further their conceptions of public ownership
and moderate legislative refwm, as welI as to conduct m c a s w d
election campaigns. They did nat militantly lead the struggling
workers.
Since its foundation, the Commuaist Party has shown how a
party should give the l e d to the trade unions and unorganized
masses. Time and again it has m o b i k d its organizer$ and fimdal
resources to support and strengthen trade union and other struggles.
Many cwmpIes of this might be cited, such as the placing of some
twenty paid argmkrs in the PMurgh area during the 1927 coal
sailre; the maintenance of many organizers during various Labor
Party campaigns; the extensive organization crews built up during
the big unemployment struggle of 193041933, the financing of
various united frunt conferenas, ctc. But this active and leading
organization work was praca'calIy unknown to the p t q - b o u r g e k
leaders of the Socialist Party. Where any such work was done it was
almost always under the direct initiative of the Left wing. It is tru~
that individual unions controlled by Socdists and also minorities of
Sowithin van'cus organizaions outlined active orgsaization
Earnpig= and strike work, but this was Iargcly spontaneous; the
Party as a whole did not follow any such general policy. Its w n t i a l
was that of a bystander, commentator and educational force,
rh&er than the rnilirant, actual leader of the workers' daily struggle
far their burning economic and politid demands.
~ll~mtia
of thi s-list
party psivity muld be cited, if
space permitted, from many i m m t S ~ L C~ g l e s organ&,

10

.
I

I
2

-'#

tion campaign$ etc., throughout the many years of the Party's
existence. But the Socialist Party's attitude during the many great
labor defense cases that came up from time to rime serves ta =emplify its non-militant relation towards the class struggle. In the
Moyer, Haywood and Pettibone case in 1907, the Left w i g of
the P a t j gave active support, but the Right wing, instinctively sensing the militant revolutionist Haywood as an enemy, d o t a g e d the
fight. fn tbe McNamara
of i 91 1, the S d a h t Pany leaders,
jointly with the American Federation of Labor, gave a certain s u p
port, unnl these brave fighters, badly advised, pleaded guilty in an
effort m save the trade unions and their leaders from p e m t i o n .
Whvcupn the Socialist Party, like the American Federation of
Labor, abandoned them wmpletely and bas never done a thing to
help them since, although McNamara and Schmidt are stiIl in jail
after twcntp-five years. h the Mooney-Billings and Sacco-Vanaetti
ems of hter years, it was the Anarchins, Syndicah& Communists
and Farmer-Labriots who t w k the lead in the fight, with the
Socialist Party tmdhg dong in the rear. And in the recent Swttsboro
ease, it was the Communkt Party that leaped quickly to the defense
of the condemned nine Neg-ro boys and by its swift action undoubtedly saved them from electrocution, while the Socialist Party only
joined the struggle in tbe later
and then lamely a d formally.
This traditional passive attitude of the Sodalist Party towards the
daily class struggle of the work- the andency to
after the
m a s q to preach at them rather than to stind milihntly at their
head on every field of batde, cosr the Socialist Patty much @1e
mass support and hdersbip. It was one of the major reasons why the
%&&st P a q never succeeded in d
y being accepted as the
fighting party of the proletariat in this countiy.

a

One of the great mistakes oJso of the kirrlist Party over many
years was its opportw1iPr handling of the vital qudm of indumd
unionism. Even before 1900 the more progressive elements among
the worhrs r e h d that the craft union4 because of s p ? d i d o n
and d c ~ t i o in
n industry, had become obsolete and that a system
of i n d d Lvlionism was imperatively necessary. AII sections of the
r e v o l u t b q movement became impregnated with industrial union
sentiment, Witb the i m c of i n d d unionism was bound up the

-L

whole quation of the organidon of the unorganized, honest Ieadership, m h t policy, etc.
It was the historic M of the Socialist Party to give dear dkection and active leadership to the industrial union movement, but it
failed dismally in this obligation. It is txve that the Party declared
~ ~ ~ e g t u ' vfor
d ythe principle of industrial unionism. But it never
told the workers dearly how to bring about industrid unionism, nor
did it give unified leadership to the movement. The Party was divided for fifteen peas into two sections over this fundamental guestion. The Right wing worked mildly within the A. F. of L. for the
principle of indusvial organization through amalgamation, but always
ready to make aa opportunist maneuver on the question with the
Gompcrs machine. O n the other hand, the revolutionary Left wing
of the Party, oumged by the corrupt regime in the A. F. of L.,directed its e
h in the main towards the realization of industrial
unionism through the incorrect policy of building dual unions, that
is, i n d d unions independent of the A. F. of L. The ou-dhg
ermmple of such dud industrial unions was the Industrial Workers of
the World, which was launched in 1905.
MdfestIy, in this situation, it was the definite responsibility of
the Party to liquidate by educational means and firm direction this
g h g contradiction in policy within its ranks and to concentrah
dt Party forces upon s milimt struggle within the trade unions for
industrial unionism. But the petty-bourgeois Socialist Party leaders
did not want an active fight for industrial unionism inside the A.
F. of L., or ou&de either. They never wanted to fight the A. F.
of L. leaders aggressively on basic issues. They were quite eontent
to have the confused situation drag along as it W ~ S - So, over many
years, they straddled the question, and the Right wing continued its
opprtunist line in the A. F. of L., while the Left wing frittered
away its strength in dual unfonmm. The typical opportunist policy on
this vital issue wars expressed ia 1912 when the Socialist Party convention endorsed the princ$c of industrial unionism hut did nat
s a t e whether this was to be brought to realization through the transformation of the old wade unions, or by the building up of the
I.W.W. and siimhr dual industrial unions.
It was not until after the organization of the Communist Party
in 1919, and especidly under the influence of the writing d Lenin
on the quesdon of work within the old d t unions, that the revo-
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lutionq movement in the United States liquidated its trdr hnal dual
union tendencies and worked out o militant campign in the A. F.
of It. for industriaI unionism, a campaign that tventually took organized & a p in the Trade Union Eduationd League.
The general consequence of the Socialist Party's whole opportunist handing of the ind&l
union question vastly reduced the
effectiveness of the Party's i n d d a l union campsugn in general. The
work of one wing of the Farq was antagonistic to that of the other,
and because of this doubly wrong policy the Sodalist Pam as a whoIe
lost i& opportunity to secwre real leadership of the masses on thk
fundamental question.

C. Anti-Ldor Party T e d Another disastrous error of the Socialist Party ia prt-war days
was its opposition in principle to the formation of the Labor Party.
This wm a mistake also h e d in by the Left wing, for ultra-Left
reasons, It is a well-known facr that m those countries where, because of specific national conditions, the trade unions were organized
before the Socialist Parties took shape, the workem' first steps into
independent political adon were in the form of organi~inglabor
based directly on the trade unions. This was notably the c w
in Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand. The United States
belonged to thk category of countries. Here, because of factors already
pointed out, the poiitid development of the workers had been delayed; but they had succctdcd in building trade unions. The consequence was that when the workers began to feel the necrssity for
organized class ditical a&n their natural tendency was to do as
thi workers in Great Britain had done by developing a politid orgaahation, a Labor Party, directly out of the unions.
But the American Soddist Party leaders never understood this
elementary fact. They resisted the n a m d trend of the workers t o
form a Labor Party. They tried mechanically to apply to the United
States a policy which was adapted to Germany, Austria and old
Russia, where the Socialist Party, either growing before or simdmneously with the trade unions, naturally became looked upon by the
workers as the prty of the working c h Thus, inatead of helping
thc workers to take their first step in political am'on through r mass
Labor Party, the S o & k Party for many y c m sought to kill thr

I
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Labor Party tendency by insisritlg upon the American workers accepting the S o d k t Party as their mass party.
Instead of being its greatest champion as it should, the Socialist
Party traditionally looked upon the Labor Party as a rival and fought
against it. Harry W.Laidler said: "The formation of these parties
[
I
d
labor parties-W.Z.F.] in various pans of the country brought
a new compttitor into the field against the Socialist Party."* Robert
Hunter, the S.P.'s early expert: on the Labor Party, said the Socialist Party "is a Labor Party and all it needs is tbe united support of
all American organizations".** He believed that to build a Labor
Party apart from the Sachist Party would be "about as foolish a
thing as ta scrap the machinerg of the A. F. of L.and to form a new
trade union movements'.***
It was only in 192 1 when the Socialist Party, with hut a handfd
of members and with its anti-Labor Party policy clearly bankrupt,
f i d y had to yield to the inevitable and endorsed ia principle the
organization of a Labor Party. But it never became reconciled to
this perspective, h refused to join with the Chicago Federation of
L a b , the Communist Par9 and other Left organizations in 1923
in a real*fight for the Labor Party. It has never ma& aa active campaign for the Labor Party. Even today it is passive upon this whole
question and d
l has the lingering feeling that the Labor Party is
its rival.
The S a d i s t Party snd the working class paid high far this long
continued anti-Labor Party tendenq. The Socialists' resistance to
the naturally and spontaneously growing Labor Party definitelv hin&red The + i t i d development of the working d m It checked the
growth of the Labor Party sentiment in the trade unions. It made it
e
k for the Gampers machine to keep the maws tied to the two
old par&. Furthermore, with i~ wrong policy, the SocUkt Party
gave up perhap the best weapon it ever had with which to fight the
Gomptrs n a & A e issue of the Labor Party. It was a s a d i c e
that the opportunist leaders could easily make, however, in their
eagerness to be on good terms with the Gompers regime. The pnwal consequence was that the Socialist Party badly failed to give
lademhip to the workers in the vita question of the development
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of their mass political consciousness and organization, and the Socialist
Parry itself as a result p i d dearly in lm of potential membership
and influence.

Another disastrous reformist tendency that prevailed all through
life of the Socialist Party dawn to the advent of the present new
leadership was the sa-caUed attitude of neutrality towards the tradc
unions. I n substance thk policy constituted a failure to put forward
the Party policy militantly in the trade d o n s . 1t was a r e f u d to
take up the cudgels for the necesary active fight against the corrupt
Gompers-Green leadcnhip to win the masses for S c d b . W.J,
Ghent, eqresing many Party decisions, difended this opportuni~
policy on the basis that the "Party does not seek to dictate to organized
labor in matters of internal organization and policy".
It is char that for Socialism to make, headway in the working
c h , especially in the trade union movement, the Socialist Party had
to come into head-on collisian with the reactionary trade union leadership. It was not a question of dictation to the unionq but of +ve
assertion of the Party policy. But the doctors, lawyers, preachers,
jourdst8, etc., who led tht Socialist Party, wanted no sueh fight.
In many instances in the trade unions, the Left Pslrty elemedtp,
notably such men as Duncan McDonald of the Illinoi miners, made
a militant fight against Gornpers. But thip was not the true policy of
the Party leadership. They wanted to cooperate with the Gompersnot fight them. Such a struggle as that made later over many
years by the Trade Union Educational League or such a determined
stand as that now being taken by John L. Lewis and the Cammitttt
for Industrial Organization against the trade union bureaucracy,
was quite foreign to the whole conception of thc opportunist S.P.
Idem They seldom got beyond the smge d shadow-bonring with
the reactiofiries.
In fact, the S.P. leaders' real tendency was to mllaborate and
amalgamate with h e Gompers regime. If they did not actually consolidate their forces with the Green ruling bureaucraq sooner, it
was primarily because of the pressure of the large and militant Left
wing in the Party. However, after the big split in 19 19 which took
the whole Left wing out of the Party, the --bourgeois
laderAip, with no Left mititants to restrain them, proceeded to drop all
the
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o e n to Gomperr and to identify thtmselvcs almost complcteIy
with the reactionary d i n g trade union clique. Says D. J. Saposs,
dealing with this period :
' f T b new &itidalignment of the k i d h with the adminh t m t i o ~form marks the end of their leademhip in tbe opp&tion
in the labor movement. T h q have ahdoned the role of initiaton
of new ima for tht h b r movement. They are no longer the center
of m v c oppoeitim.
"In its political u c t i u i t : ~the SoeinIist Party has followed a coarse
similar to that of the Socialint tmde unionists Tt bas ceased attacking
the conservative unimr and ladem*
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This traditional policy of the Socialist Party leadership to temporize and compromise with the reactionary American Federation
of Labor officialdom was d k o u s to the development of the Socidist Party as the reJ leading force in the hbor movement. The only
way the S o c W Partg could have come. forward as the vanguard
of the working h was by a policy of sustained militant struggle on
aII fronb against the Gompers regime, and in this it failed dismally.
In summing up the general situation during the pre-war period,
it can be wfely said that if the Sa~ialistParry had carried on a policy
of c h struggle, as indicated in the foregoing, it could have defeated the Gompers regime and given the trade union movement a
Socialist lea&rship. In those days the Gompers machine was not SO
deeply entrenched, trade union democracp was much more ~revalent,
Red-baiting was not so e&&ve (for the reactionaries then only
deemed the revolution pretty much as an abstraction), and a welldirected fight could have upset the old lcalrship.
Even as it was, with a11 the wishy-washy opportunist policies of
the Socislist Party, psdvity in strikes, organization campaigns Labor
defense cases, etc. j its confused industrial union policy; its antiLabor Party program; its weak fight against Gompers, etc,, etc.,the Socialist forces made distinct headway in the unions. In 1912
they controlled such organizations as the brewery workers, bakery
workers, shingle weavers, cap makers, ?inters, Western Federation of Miners, machinists, fur workers, journeymen tadom, ladies
garment workers, coal miners, etc. They also controlled many central Lbor unions and large numbers of local unions, as well as m g
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minorities in the printers, cigar makers and almost every other labor
organization. In the 1912 Ameriean Federation of Labor Convention, the M i s t candidate for Presidtnt, Hayes, polled 5,073 votes
against Gompers' 1 1,974. A determined policy on the part of the
Socialist Parry leademhip would have soon carried the majority of
the trade union movement. But such n policy was not applied. And
to make matters worse, the petty-bourgeois leadership of the Socialist Party proceeded to mash comgettly the hhopes of the Socialist
forces winning the trade union leadership by driving thousands
of the best proletarian elements out of the Party during the big
Party split of 19 12, of which I shall speak further dong,

The World War prented a golden opportunity to the Sociakt
to develop its strength and m a s leadership, but it fumbled
the whole matter and faiIed to orgnize the masves effectively for
anti-war struggk. There was undoubtedly a huge sentiment among
the broad ranh of the people against America's entry into the war.
This was demonstrated, among other things, by the election of
WiLSDtt on his anti-intervention program, and a h by the total immediate failure of the volunteer system to recruit sddiers for the
war. Not only did the situation offer a splendid opportunity for mass
anti-war work, but this was also the centraI revolutionary task
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time.
But t h e reformist-Ied S o d a h Party proved incapbk of rising to
the occasion. It did not develop a definite and well-organized mas
struggle against the war. True enough, the Left wing, led by Deb
and Ruthenberg, did succeed in putting the Party on record against
the war and in d~veloping considerable anti-war agitation, even
though this was somewhat of a +fist
type and not yet a real
Bolshevik anti-war policy aiming at transforming the war into a
revolutionary struggle against capitalism.
The Right wing, however, took an equivocal pitian towards the
war. Many of the petty-bourgeois leaders--Russell, Walling, Spargo,
Simonq Stokes, Ghent, e t c . j p l i t away from the Party on a pra' war program. The rest dillydallied with the question and, i
n effect,
sabotaged the Party's anti-war resolution. So that there was no real
c r y d k t i o n of the Party's forces to mobilize the masses agaiast
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the war, no serious attempt to win the trade unions to an ant
position, no organization of anti-war stnikes, etc.
The general result was that, instead of making the huge gains
that it should have made, the Socialist Party, because of its vaciIlating,
opportunist pliq on the war, only made a relatively moderate membership increw in the war years, And this advance was more than
offset by a disastrous sharpening of the struggle betwecn the Right
and Left wings in the Party over the reformist leadership's opportunist war-time policies, and also by serious lows of position and
control in the trade unions. During the war the Sociaiist Party p i d
heavily for its Iong years of wrong trade union policy. Because the
Swidist Party had not entrenched iwIf in the unions in former times
by a rn%tant'smggle based on sound principles, the Gomperrr dique
was in firm command at the crucial moment and was able to use its
oflicid control with t e h g effect to swing the trade unions to a prowar position. Thus it largely isohted the Socialist Party and crippled
the whole zmti-war struggle. T h e Socialist Party reformist leaders
muffed the war situation almost completely. What should have resulted in a great victory of the Party they eventually turned into a
serious defeat.

A deadly, disastrous sin of the reformist petty-bourgeois leadership of the Socialist Party against the working class and the Socialist
Party was its hostile attitude towards the Bolshevik Rwian revolution. Perhaps nothing in the whole history of the Socialist Party did
more to destroy that Party's internd unity, prevent its growth, and
kil! its mass influence than the bitter warfare that the profewrs,
preachers, lawyers, and similar non-proletarian elements running
the Socklist Party directed for many years against the Soviet government.
The advent of the October Revolution presented an unequaled
opportunity for the Socialist Party to educate and organize the masses.
Here, a t last, was the muchdreamt-of, l o n g - p h e d socialism come
into being after a glorious victory over Russian tsarism and capitalism. The revolution taught a rhousand vital lessons in proIetarian
theory, strategy and tactics; the heroism of its fighters was an
inspiration to the toiling masses of the world; it gave the first red
ray of hope to the opprewd in a11 countries. What a tremendous
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o p p o d q for the Socialist Party to b d d itself by wing this great
world-shaking event for the furtherance of the Socialist cause in the
Unired Smtcs! And together with this immense propaganda value
of the Russian revolution. to the SociaLmt Party there was also the
duty-bound revolutior.ary task upon the shoulders of the Socialist
Parry to u4e dl its power to organize the masw to defend the
newly-formed Soviet government, attacked on dl sides as it was by
capitalist forces.
Durhg all the years of its existence it has been one of the
Wongesc factors in the growth of the Communist Party that it has
fully understood the revolutionary signifiance of the Soviet government and thoroughly appreciated the ppportunities and revolutionary
dudes connected therewith. But not so the S o d k t Pafty. Its pettybourgeois leaders were not revolutionists. They did not want to
destroy capitalism, bu! to reform it. The Russian revolution was a
thing alien and hostile to them. The overthrow of c
a
m in
R u d a in Octokr, 1917, was against their plan of gradually transforming society from capidism to sociaIism. So, instead of supporting
the Soviet government as all true revolutionists must, they viewed it
with hatred and spared no words in denouncing it. And all this was
the antagonistic position assumed towards the Soviets
the Second IntemationaI.
Throughout the Iife of the Russian revolution, the American
&cialist press has reeked with anti-Soviet attacks, even though the
Socialist Party bas grudgingly endorsed the Soviet government bemuse of m a s pressure. Hillquit clearly expressed the general attitude
of his co-middle class leaden when he declared, in a spirit of thorough
"The Soviet government bas been the greatat ddisapter and calamity that bas ever occurred to the Swialist movement. Let us dimdate
o ~ 1 v from
e ~ the Soviet
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Every dander against the U.S.S.R. sent forth by bourgeois entmies was picked up, repeated and enlarged upon in the Socidist press.
The Party leaders accused the Soviet government of "Red imperialism", of starving u d oppressing the masses, of betraying the

SdaM
to thc

a w e . Norman Thomas, characteristidy, added hi voice
deplorable antiSoviet chorus when he said:

thing, however, h certaini the Rtdan govemmmt rulw
and terror, with
policu, espionage ptld arbitrary
cxecubom."*

by ~y

Gommm WoU and Green did not outdo the W i s t leaders
in vicio& aG-soviet attacks. And as for Hearst, he copied many of
his worst h n d e m from the columns of the Jewish S d s t POFWW~.

The Socialist Party herokd the Menshevik counter-revolutionary
Abramovicb when he came to the United States, and thc Imutgcois
world applauded the shameful spemdt of Hillquit, Icader of the
Sodalist Party, acting as attorney for former Rush capitalist oil
interests in the American mum in an effort to force the Soviet
gwernment to return their confiscated property.
Of alI the non-revoIutionarg policies in the history of the Socialist Party petty-bourgeois leaden their anti-Soviet line was the
worst md most d#rvuctivt to the health, growth and mass leadership of the Socialist Party. It was the poison fruit of many years of
reformism in all its putrid rotteaneas, It worked profoundly to undermine the htcgritp of the $ock&t Party, to aXjcnatc from it the
best fighting elements in the working c l m and to weaken its rnm
in&cnct generally. This enmity towards the U.S.S.R. had a powerful effect in driving still deeper the wedge separating the Socialist
and Communist Parties, Altogether it was a decisive factor in r e
ducing the Sodist: Party to the impotency which it has suffered in
the past fifteen years. The anticSoviet policy of the Soedist Party
leaders was an aid and comfort to the mitalist enemies of the rev*
lutioni and it &owed condusiwly that &ise pettyhurgeois opporrunkits never could build the So&t
Party into a powerful
revolutionary mass party.

G. N e d Dm$ in C h s C O Z ~ ~ W I F ~
After the World War the American big capitalists initiated their
notorious movement far speeding up the workers. It was the period
of the great rationalidon of industry. New methods of driving the
workers were introduced m dl sidcs and the toilers' productivity

increased. T o stcurt some pretense of consent of the workers
to the inhuman sspeed-up, all sorts of welfare system%bonus plans,
old age pensions, and the like were established. Beaides this, illusiaas
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were intensively cultivated far and wide among the workers by
Carver, Gillette, and many others to the e%ect that through thc
new-fangled employee stock-ownedip p h s they werc actudy
buying control of the industries and were on thc highroad to same
sort of colIectivc commanweafth. This speed-up movement raged
nearly dl through the Coolidge prosperity period, from about 1922
to 1929. It spread in the unorg~~1iztd
as well as e
d industries.
It vastly increased the exploibtion af the workers and brought fresh
billions into the coffers of the money-drunk cqnkdists.
The top A. F. of L. leaden, true to their reactionary role, fitted
thcmselvts into this whole speed-up program. They declared that
strikes and the c h srmggIe were o b k t e and that the way of the
workers to prosperity now Isy through cooperation with the bwses
to increase produciion--of which the workers werc somehow to get
an increased ahare. The A. F. of L. leaders adopted the whole
speed-up system under the euphonious phrases of the "new wage
plan" and the "higher strategy of labr''. They hired efficiency
engineers for the unions and srt up the B. & 0.plan and other fornu
of 'hnion-management cooperation" to apply the b-a
speed-up.
As P result of this monstrous clas collaboration policy the A. F. of
L. leaders reduced the unions to a semi-compy union status, to
mere appendages of rhe employers' production schemes. The workers'
hard-won worfig condttions were ruthldy sacrificed. In consequence, the unions declined steadily in membership and fighting
spirit, For the first time in historg they did not grow during a period
of ecanomic expansion. The whole trade union movement was
afflicted w i h dry rot.
As befitted revolutionary organizations, the Communist Party
and Trade Union Educational League fought uncompromisingly
against this whole speed-up development. The Communists raised
the question in every trade union. They denounced the B. & 0.
plan
as disastrous to the trade unions and the interests of the worke~;
they expwed the many ilZusi011sthat were beiag built up around em&yee-sto&buying, Lbor banking, etc.; they demanded a fighting,
cIass -gale policy. And in making this fight the Commuths had
to face whotesale expulsion and discharge from industry and labor
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unions all over the country; for the combined employers and reactionary trade union leaders proceeded to extremts to break up all
opposition to their class collaboration program. Never in the history
of the American labor movement was trade union.democracy at
such a low ebb. The brave fight it made in these times was one of the
best pages of the life of the Communist Party,
How did the Socialist Party meet its revolutionary duty in rhis
rritical situation, when the masses needed correct leadership so
acutely? As usual, it did not rist to the occasian. O n the contrary,
the S d i s t trade union leaders everywhere i4entificd themselves
almost completely with the Green leadership. This was the period
cited by S a p s above when the S.P. leaders ceased to k the trade
union opposition. They became ardent supprters and theorizers at
the "new wage @cy" and the "higher strategy of labor". They condemned strikes as entirely out of date. In no industry did class collabration reach greater heights than in the Smialist-controlled
needle trades. And nowhere was the expulsion policy so ruthlcsdy
applied against the militant Left-wing elements wha were fighting
to keep the trade unions from being used as tools ta increw the
exploiration of the working dm.
The Socialist Party made no tight whatever against the infamous
3.& 0.plan, union management cooperation, the "new wage policy", and dl the rest of it. TI& is not suprising#because the whole
Second International had become greatly cn&uscd over the speed-up
movement, helped the bosses to introduce it in E q ,and hailed it
as the broad way to socdim. Spbhg fancy rheories about an
"oqpized capital;sm", "supef-imperialh", and a long priad of
peaceful mpitalk expansion ahead, they outdid even the hectic
American capitalist theorists of the rationalization of industry
movement.
In 1925, when the Communist Party was fighting against unianmanagement cooperation throughout the trade union movement,
Norman Thomas, in his booklet, W h Is I d w M Dmwwa6y ?,
gave his bIessing to &the notorious B. t 0.speed-up plan in the
iollowing words:

..

the mihad managemmt in return for improved stand&
of shop p d u & t doing im otmm to keep the men supplied with
work w that the men gain, not h,
by &&qThc
. plan s e a u
to he working well.

. . ."
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The Amerkan Socialist Parry naturalIy suffered severely from
the bourgeoisie in &is situation. It became afflicted
with the dry rot that had infected the trade union movement generally, except that the Socidist Party got it worse. The Party sank

its d i n g after

to the lowest stage in all its career, both ideologicdy and organizationally. By 1929 it had remaining only about 7,500 membets, and

its revolutionary spirit had dropped to correspdhgIy low levels.
This was the generaily unlovely period of the Party's support to
LaFolIette's candidacy, the removal of the class struggle dam
from the Socialist Party membership application card, the agitation
of Norman Thomas to change the name of the Party, etc. In short,
the Socialist Party was on the very brink of bankruptcy, The Parry
was harvesting in full the bitter crop of its many Inng years of
opportunist petty-burgeois leadership.
'

When the great economic crash came in 1929 the employers,
with the Hoover government their willing t d , proceeded to dash
the wages of the employed and to force the millions of unemployed
to starve. It is a notorious fact that the A. F, of t leaders to&
no real action against this brutaI course. On the contrary, they ohjectivcly aided the employers by viciously fighting against unemployment insurance and in support of Hoover" sbgger system, and
by signing the infamous Hmver nwtrike-n+wagt-cut agreement
which enabled the bosses freely to dash wages. And for all this
they were duly praised by the -pitalist press.
The Communist Party, on the other hand, militantly took up
the fight for the employed and unemployed workers. Beginning with
the famous March 6, 1930, national demonstration of 1,250,000
unemployed, it carried on during the next three years a most aggressive struggle for and with the unemployed all over the country.
It organized hundreds of local and state mass hunger marches and
other demonstrations. It carried out several national conventions and
marches on Washington. During these bitter fights the Communist
Party and its following faced violent attacks from the police; hundreds were clubbed and jailed and many were killed in the dtmon~mntions.The generd effect of this big mass struggle under the
Communist P q leadership was to make unemptopent *ante

and relief red m t s in thi country and to force many important
relief can&ns
from the employem. It also hid a strong foundation for the Communist Party among the masses.
And what was the Sadist Party doing in these crucial early
years of the crisis? Practically nothing to organize the unemployed
masses for struggle, It was still par111yzedfrom its f m e r orgy of
c k c o ~ b o t i o n .While the Communist Party was on the firing
line with huge demonstrations and other struggles, we find Norman
Thomas and J. P. Morgan jointly suprthg over the radio the
useless block-aid qstem. The Socialist Party) it is true, talked a great
deal in these years of unemployment relief and insurance, but it did
not go out and fight for them. It was only after the Cornmuid
Party had long taken the lead in the smgglc, and c s p t d y after
new Left elements began to develop in the Socialist Party, that that
Party slowly started to play a role in the strugglc of the unemployed.
When the great strike movement began under RooseveTt7sregime
early in 1933, again the Socialist Party could not rise to the situation
and give the awakening masses effective leadership. Manifestly, it
was the ~ of every revolutionary orginization to do dl pd'blc
(as the CommuniPt Party did) to stimulate and lead the employed
workers in tl& the first red attack t h y had made against their
oppressors for a dozen yeam But the Socialist Party was incapabk
of giving such aggressive leadership. Instead, ia leader Norman
Thmas, who in 1932 bold complained of the "docility of labor"
and who was now filled with i U k about Rmstvelt's ''&aku",
m U y tried to put a damper on the struggle by telling tbe worlrtrs
that "strilw are inadvisable at the present the".* But the workers
paid no attention to Thomas' oppommism, no more than they did
to the similar advice of William Green; but went &tly
ahead
with the development of their enormous gtrike movement. Thus,
once more, the Sodalist Party) moved by reformist eonsiderations,
dillY-d&d witb a crucial situation and failed to give the masscs the
ne-ry
class struggle leaderithip.

In this section I have shown that historidly the Sodalift Party
bas consistently viohted the first fundamental of the daPs struggle
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policp: namely, the newssity of coming forward aggressively as the
champion of the masses in their daily figha for urgent economic and
political demands. Instead of fulfilling this imperative necessity, the
whole history of the Socialist Party is an abdication of such mas
leadership. T h e illustrations Jted: the Socialist Party's traditionally
passive attitude towards strikes and organization campaigns; its
long-continued contradictory industrid union policy; its anti-Labor
Party tendency; iw opportunist policy of neutrality towards the
trade unions; its failure ditantly to fight the Gompers-Green
bureaucracy; i~ wavering pIicy during the war; its hastilitg to the
Soviet government; its failure to fight the deadly union-management
cooperation speed-up movemex~t; and its lethargy in the struggIes
of the unemplqed and employed workers during the early years of
the present industrial c-all
these wrong ~ l i c i e stogether amply
prove the point that the Socialist Party has failed to give a fighting
leadership to the toilers in their situations of deepest need. And to
these illustrations others wdd be added as, for example, the Socialist Paw's complete neglect of the burning Negro question over
many year4 its opportunistic handling ofthe youth kue, its haphazard
cmsideration of the problems of women, the foreign-born, etc.
The general result of the Socialist Party's traditional flabby,
reformist, class-coUrborationmt policies, dictated by its opportunist
middle dass leadership, has been that the Soc'dist Paw could not
and did nat become a strong, mass revolu&nary Party. Its leaders
ducked and evaded and compromised every struggle and h e that
the workers were basically interested in. By its weak, opportunist
course, the Socialist Party was unable to defeat its powerful capitalist enemies and their labor leader h k h m e n . Hence it did not
secure the leadershiu of the masses and become their accepted revolutionary party. ~ i e r ecouId be no other outcome of ke Socialist
P q ' s long record of opportunist vacillations and abdication of
leadership in the dass struggle than the Party's present crisis and
obvious failure.

I

CHAPTER THREE

A Generation of Reformism and Its
Disashous Effects (Continued)
2. THEWAR ACAMSTTHE LEFTWING

I N ANALYZING the

basic reason for the histo&d hilure of the
Socialist Party-which was its lack of a Mafxl'an policy of class
struggle--let us now consider briedy the Socialist Party's experience
with the second element going to make up such a policy of dass
struggle, i-c., the nectssiry of hying a firm foundation for the Socialist Party by the cultivation of a strong body of revolutionsy
Mamian understanding in the Party membership and among its mass
following. In doing this we shall see that the opportunist Socialist
Party leaders haw violated this fundamental no less deeply and consistently than they did the other imperative essentiaI of a dass struggle
policy (which we have previously discussed), that of giving effective
leadership to the masses in their daily struggles, and with equally
diwtrous result+.
It was obviously an indispensable first condition for the succes of
the Socdist Party that it systematically educate the broadest possible
ranks of Marxian revo~utionipts.Such revoIutionmts furnish the
rimy understanding of the capitalist system, they are the tireI e s organizers of the mas- the bravest fighters in every crisis, the
indefatigable builders of the Party, the heart and brain of the c h
struggle. T o try to build a revolutionary Socialist Party without
deveIoping the Marxian understanding of its membership is to attempt the classically i m p i b l e task of making bricks without straw.
This would seem to be a pretty self-evident fact, hut the Socialist
Party has grossly ignored it throughout its existence. The Right wing
petty-bourgeois intellectuals controlling the Socialist Party, instead of
carefully cultivating the life-giving revolutionary tendency, looked
upon it as a hatile f orcc, and they spared no efforts to check it, to
repress it, to extinguish it, indeed to burn it out of the Party. This
action on their part was logical enough as they had no intentibn what-

ever of making the Socialist Party a revolutionary party, h this
ruthless war against the Left wing, continued for a generation, is to
be found a fundamend reason for the failure of the Socialist
Party and for its present critical condition.

Before describing this war against the Left wing it will be well
briefly to a n a l p h e Socialist Party groups. The Right wing, which
dominated the Socialist Partp from its organization down to the
present year, was, during the heyday of the Party, made up of several
group Chiefly these were:
A. The extreme Right, roughly, the Bernstein revisionist tendency, was composed of a miscellaneous group of lawyers, doctors,
preachers, etc., sum& as Hamiman, Bergcr, Cahan, Stokes, Wilson,
Mih, Hoan, Laidler, ud d. Previously, I have indicated the general
reformist tendency of this grounovernmtnt ownership, municipal
socialism, parliamentary reform, anti class struggle, etc.
3,The agrarian group, also of extreme Right tendency, was
strong in the farming districts of Oklahoma, Kansas, Texas,
Wfashington, etc. It was a remnant from the breakup of the old
Populist movement and it generally supported the line of the Right
wing intellectuals, with the addition of its cheapmoney vagaries and
a particularly utopian slant to its "Socialism". This tendency cry*
talliztd chiefly around such papers as Wayhd's Coming No&,
dppad to Reason and Arkansas Ripsaw.
C . The trade union group was compowd of labor officials, Iikt
Van Lear and Johnston (Machinis&), Walker, Germer and Hayes
(Miners), Hayes (Printers), Barnes (Cigarma ken), Maurer
(Plumbers), Sfremp (Painters), SchIe~inger (I.L.G.W.U,), etc.
In general this o p p r r u n h group also followed the lead of the
Right wing intellectuals, except that they placed more stress upon
trade union questions.
D. The soccalled center or Kautsky tendency was composed
mainly of petty-bourgeois intellectuals. It included Hillquit,
Simons, Oneal, Lee, etc. These people were sticklers for Mam*an
p h r a c if not for Ma&
deeds. This group gave the Socialii
P a y its dominant leader for 34 ycars, Morris Hillquit,
Historically these four reformist group functioned unitedly as
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the Right wing of the Socialist Party, especially in the war igahst
the Left wing, and they had the hdcing chiefly of the non-proletarians and the skilled worker members of the Party. It is true that
the Hillquit center group kept up a running quarrel for years with
the raw opportunism of the extreme Right "*office
socialism"
eiemenrs. But this fight was superficial and did not conflict with the
basically ref ormist line of the Party. The onIy serious difierences that
developed within the broad Right wing were during the war when
the pro-war Sprgo, Stokes, Walling, ct d, quit the Party. After
the national split of 1919 the four Right group, or what was still left
of them, gradually coalwccd and became pra-y
indistinguishable
from each other in one crassly opportunistold g w d leadership.
The Left wing of the Socialist Party was more homogeneous
than the R i h t wing. It was made up almost entirely of prolarians,

chiefly unskilled and immigrant workers, with an occasional revdutionary intellectul Through its twenty years of history within the
S o & k Party it was led by such figure3 as Hagertp, Trautmaan,
Titus, Marcy, Haywood and Ruthenberg. Deb was usually a militant spokesman of the Left wing program, but he took no active
part in &aping Party policy in conventions, tte. He never idenrified
himself with the Left in its or+d
struggles against the Right, nor
did he become involved in any of the various Party splits.
The Left wing took flat k u e with the whole reformist line of
the dominant Right wing intellectual leadership. Basing itself upon
the fundamentals of Mam and Engels, it fought to give the Socialist
Party a program and policy of revoIutionary clam struggle. It op
postd the current opportunist theories of the paceful taking over
of the government and the plan af buying up the industries, and it
placed in opposition to them the Marxian perspective of the overthrow of capitalism by open struggle and the expropriation of the
cxprophtors without compensation. It condemned the Socialist
Party leaders' passivity in the daily cIass struggle and their dass
collaboration policies and compromks with Gompersism. It demanded r program of active struggle against the employers and war to
the knife against the capitalist-minded leaders of the trade unions.
Although the LRfr wing was the revolutionary element within
the Party, it nntvertbeles suffered from many and seriotvs theoretid
and practical weaknes, arising mainly out of its inexperience and
idedogid unripenesa These errors in general tended in the diredon
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af "Left" sectarianism. They were largely a heritage from De
Leanism, and were usually semi-Syndicalist in character, Among
the more important of these Left wing errors were (1) Confusion
regarding the nature of the revoIutionsry role of the Party, with
tendencies to make the industrial unions the leading fighting force
of the proletariat; (2) Wrong theories of the composition of the
future dictatotship of the proletariat, with tendencies towards the
Syndicalist trade union state; (3) Underestimation of the resistance
power of caphlism and theorics of accomplishing the revolution bp
the faldcd-ms general strike ; (4) Underestimation of the struggle
for immediate pohtiml demands and tendencies towards anti-parIiamcntaism ; (5) Neglect of work within the mass trade unions and
a utopian belief in dual industrial unionism; (6) Underestimation
of the importance of the farming, Negro and lower petty-bourgeois
masses as united front allies of the proletariat. Further secrarian tendencies were: against the Labor Party in principle; overstress upon
the religious question, and the ignoring and flouting of American
traditions and culture.
Thew various theoretical and practical errors of the Left wing
worked greatly to hrrld back the prcgress of the Party. They tended
to break its contacts with the masses and to push the Party into
sectarian isolation. And, added to this, they handicapped the fight
against the Right wing, for Right opportunism cannot be defeated
with "Left " sectarianism, But the overwhelming responsibility for
the failure of the Socialist Party is to be found in the rank opportunism of the dominant ppty-bourgeois leadership, and not in the
weakness of the Left. Despite its many errors the Left wing was
basically correct in its striving for a chss struggle policy, It was the
healthy Party core, and only through the correction of its shortcomings and the development of its general program of clm struggk
was ir p i l e to build the Socialist Party into a revolutionary party.
It must be added, however, that the political line of the Right
wing in no sense served to correct the errors of the Left wing.
Xts tendency was to drag the Party off in another direction, to the
swamp of Right oppommism.
The Iongqontinued struggle between the Right and Left wings,
the highlights of which I shall now proceed to relate, placed the
issue squarely: s h d the Socialist Parry be a party of petty-bourgeois
reform or of proletarian class struggle? The cleavage was funda-
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mental and the protracted fight took on the character of class struggle
wirhin the Party. So that during the various spljts in many local
branches the line of division ~d
dmmt exactly between the
proletarians and non-proletarians, the working dass elements going
with the Left wing out of the Party. That the %list Party failed
to become a revolutionary prry is primarily an exp-ion
of the fact
that the Left wing was defeated in its struggle for control of the
Pary and v ~ a scompelled to build a new, revolutionary organization,
the Communist Party.

EwZy Phases of the I--Pwty

Smggle

Hardy had the Socialkt Party come into ucistenct in 1901 as a
result of the historically justified split away from the deadly sectarianism of the %list Labor P a m than the fatal contrd of the reformist lawyers, doctors, preachers, journalists, ete., asserted itself.
And, likewig, as the corrective to thew baneful elements and tendencies, the revolutionary Left wing of the Party slowly began to
take shape and to voice its program. With the passage of the years
the cleavage between the Right and Lcf t wings of the Party b e m e
more pmnounced, until finally the hevitaMc complete break came.
The first sharp division in the Party on a major scale occurred
in 1905 over the question of industrial unionism whicb, then as now,
was bound up with the whole question of militant trade mion
policies. The Left wing, repelled by the reactionary leadership and
program of the A. F. of L., was for establishing new and independent revolutionary industrial unions, and the Right wing, opposed
t o fighting policies generally, was against it. Under the leadtrship
of Debs, Haywood and De Leon (Socialist Labor P q ) the Industrial Workers of the World w s f lormed in Chicago in 1905. In
his autobiographJ Haywood note8 the division between Right and
Left over the I.W.W. convention, stating that "None of the polit i c k s of the Socialist Party, such as Berger, Hillquit, Spargo or
Hayes, took partm.*
The factional struggle scron spread from the question of indwtrial unionism to many phases of the Parry's theory and practice.
The ptriod in question was one of growing working dass organization and dass consciousn~under the fierce pressure of expanding

It was a time sf many bitter strikes, of which
the-blowly Chiago ecamstcrs' strike of 1905, with 21 killed and 451
wounded, was an example. Since 1898 the A. F. of 1;. had increased
its membership from 270,000 to 1,550,000. The Socialist Party
also reflected this rising tide of working class militancy, its me&
bership increasing from some 12,000 in 1901 to 41,479 in 1909
wxld its inffuence rapidly growing in the trade unions.
The Left wing demand for a c h struggle policy by the Party
bc-c
stronger and stronger nnd new Left Ladcrr dcvelopd. Increasingly the clash grew between the revolutionary elements and
the pettg-bourgeois leadership. The former wanted to make the
Party into a red fighting instrumtnt of the working class, the latter
wanted to follow s policy of reformism and compromise, Tension was
acute, especially in several states in the Far West, where the k s t organized and most revolutionary sections of the Party were located.
The first serious split occurred in the Pacific Northwest early in 1909.
The split took p k e in Everett, Washington. The leader of the
Lefts was Dr. H. T.Titus, editor of the &
S
Soddist, and the
head of the Right wing was Dr. E. J. Brown, in later years Mayor
of Seattle on a fusion ticket. The struggle centered around the
question of reformist petty-bourgeois domination of the Party, and
American capitdim.
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against the suppression of rhe revolutionary elements and their program of struggle. The Left wing was supported m d y by lumber
workers, city laborers and "5tump" farme-; whereas the Right wing
drew its support chiefly from the petty businwen, intellecntds,
skilled workers and farmers.
The Left wing had behind it a majority of the Party members,
bur when the convention e m b l e d , the Right wing, which controlled the Party machinery, had managed to scare up a majoimity of
the delegates. A split ensued and in consequence there were two
&list Parties in the state. Whereupon, the opportunist-controlled
National Executive Commitrcs recognized the Right wing claim,
excluding the Lefts, including myself, from tbe Party.
This blow of the Right wing Saciak Party leadership was characteristic of their growing war against the revolutionary element in
the Party. Its consequence was, of course, seriously t o injure the
Pattg. Hundreds of the best members, not only in Washington, but
dso to a lesser extent in Oregon, Idaho, and Cdfornia, were driven
out of the Party and never returned to it. Moa of h e m (like my-

self) joined the 1;W.W. and became Syndicah. The whole affair
was a criminal waste of good proletarian fighters, the real builderg of
the Party, by the reformist leadership. But this rupture was soon to
be followed by another+lso
forced by the opportunist Socialist
Party plicies and leaders and far more disastrous to the Partythe big narional split of I9 12.

In this period the working c h was in a state of great foment
The trade unions were growing rapidly and conducting many bitterly-fought strikes. The I.W.W. was achieving a s p e w c u l r advance with the Lawrence textile strike and several other big struggles.
T h e Socialist Patty was growing rapidly and making fast headway
in gaining Ieadership in the trade unions. It was & the time of
the Roosewlt Bull Moose movement. All this militancy and struggle
.of the toiling masses emphasized the futility of the reformist policies
.of the Socialist Party leadership and stressed the need for a program
of h struggle. But the opportunist leadership clung firmly to their
reformist line. The struggle between the Right and Left wings of
the Party quickly spread and sharpened.
The Left wing, grown strong in this period of mass awakening,
had built a national movement around the 2 m t w d m . d Sociakt
R&w, published by the Kerr Co., and the chief figures of which
were Bill Haywood and Mary Marcy. This center circulated the
works of Marx and Engels, routed revolutionary speakers, printed
mvolutionary pamphlets and developed the Left wing theory and
practice on current events. InevitabIy this Left center came into
direct confiict with the National Ofice of the Socialist Parry, which
systematically played down revoIutionary theory and agi;&n
of
every sort and poured out a flood of reformist propaganda,* In
consequence a struggle for organizational control of the Party

*me

flock of %cialist Party Right wing intdectualr produced lotu of
books and parnphleh but not one important Marxian work. The books of
Myers, R w U and Sinclair, dtbough f d of valuable fsctud material, were
but &S
muckraking. Hillquit's booIra were only academic Marxism, and
thost of Sirnous and Ontd w t c d an opportunist conception of Amcriun
history. Ghent and London, in their books, Bsnmolmt F&tisrse
and Tka I m
H d , produced notable w o h but they a h were saturated with oppommht
cwtceptionh
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developed, and the wh& situation came to a dimax in the May,
1912, Socialist Party convention.
T h e immediate program of the Lft wing in this crucial fight
centered around three major issues: against the opportunist pettybourgeois control of the Party; fox a plicy of militant industrial
unionh; and against the parliamentary opportunism and votecatching policies of the lcadership. The Left wing program at this
stage was stated in Haywood's and Bohn's pamphlet, Idu&1
S ~ c i a hThis
.
program contained many characteristic semi-syndic&
ist errors, such as underestimation of the role of the Patty and of
B e imporrance of p - h l political &man&, illusim about dud
industrial unionism, etc., but the essence of it was the traditional
and comct aim of the Left wing to give the S O W Party a policy
of c h struggle.
The outcome of the convention was a major defeat for the
Left wing, which was beaten on dl its Its questions. Firstly, it
lost in the matter of diplacing the opportunist leadership, because
during the preconvention elections so many petty-bourgeois elements
gar thtmsclves elected as Llqatts that the convention was infested
with and ~ o m ~ l c domhmd
te~~
by all som of careerkt lawyers,
journalist9, doctors, ctc. SecondIy, it Imt srlSo on the question of
indusbiat unionism; for although the canventian trdorsed industrial
uniohm in principle, it took no step to put it into effect through
correcting the opportunist practices of the Party leaders in the A. F.
of L.and by liquidating the dual unionimn of the Left wing.
But the Left wing sufltred its Ccisive defeat on the g e n e d
question of parliamentary opportunism. The Left wing's essential
psition m against the Party's king merely a vote-catching body,
and wanted it to become a revolutionary propaganda organi~tion
md lead in developing broad mass strugglta, especially on the economic field. But the Right wing was skillful maugh to evade the
main h e . It shifted the attack away from its own political opportun* and narrowed the fight down to an mult upon ;be Left
wing's advocacy of sslbotage. Sabotage at the timc was very popular
in the French Syndicalist movement and it had been taken up by
the LW.W. and the Left wing of the Socialist Party. It was the
pooxest p ' b k buc for the Left wing to defend and the C O ~ ~ c ~ l t i O t i
voted 190 to 91 a g a h it, adopting the notorious Artide 11, Section
6, amendment to the Party constitution, which ran :
c.l)

"Any memkr of the PPny who oppom political a d o n or adcrimr, bata age or other mttbodn of violtact am o wtapm
of the woikiag dm to aid in itn emancipation &dl bt t@hd
fmmembtrahip in the Party."
vwatw
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Thc basic meaning of all this ran far beyond the suppression of
sabotage ; it meant that the Party leadership had rejected the policy of class struggle and had turned still deeper into
the reformism that was ldlling the Party. Its lawyer-doetor-preacher
heads were detcrmtted to wipe out the revolutionary tendency in the
Party and they foIIowed up this convention victory by having Haywood recalled by referendum from the National Executive Cound.
Thus, Bill Haywood, the revohtionary fighter who was worth
scvcrd carloads of the apporhinist intellectuals who were running
and ruining the Socialist Patty, was not deemed worthy of sitting
upon the Party's executive, The elimination of Haywood was r
Iogical climax to the leademhip's long and fatal war against the Left
wing and its program of d m struggle, the war that brought about
the historic Mure of the Socialist Party.
The outcome of the 1912 convention was a real disaster to the
Wist Party, one from which it never fully recovered; The deadly
grip of the petty-bourgeois leadership was strengthened and their
opportmist policies more deeply intrenched. A sort of dent split
developed, thousands of the best proletarian members, Haywood
mong them, quitting the Party in disgust, never to return ; many of
them going to Syndicalism and the I.W.W. Thus the Party was
drained of its best blood, and the loss of all these workers and basic
Party builders soon showed itself in a real &dine of the organiaation. The Party dropped in membership from 118,045 in 19 12 (the
highest point it ever reached in all its history) t o 79,3 74 in 1915. I&
national elcthn vote fell from 897,011 in 1912 to 585,113 in
1916. And, of decisive impomnce, hs previous rapid advance in the
trade unions was stopped and the Socialist Party lost ia opportunity
to win the leadership of the A. F. of L. Refomfrm9m
had dealt a
mortal blow to the Socialist Party.
The 19 12 split, howevtr, could not be the dtcisivt fight between
the reformist and revolutionary forces in the Socialist Party. The
Sewnd International, which was not yet discredited by its betrayal in
the World War and in the accompanying revoIutionary struggles,mil
had great prestige as the revolutionary organization of the working

thc advocacy of
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the Party of Marx and Engels. Hence its b - o p p o r t u n l
American section a h remined the power to attract r e v a l u t i o ~
workerr. Moreover, the Sorialist Party Left wing, still saturated with
se&n
and Syndicalt tendencies, was as yet insuffificientlg developed
ideologically to build a separate revolutionary party. So, with the
great vitality and persistence which bespeaks rhe correctness of its
revolutionary line, the Left wing, recovering from the dksmous
1912 defeat, began once more to build the Socialist Party and to
orgsnize its forces and program wirhm it. But the opportunism of
the Socialist Party leadership was soon m cause r compkte break
between the reformGt Right and the rewlutiamry Left and to call
into being the Communist Party.
&IS,

The 19 19 split in the American Socialist Party uras p r t of the
world-wide break between the reformist and r t v 0 1 1 1elemenra
~
in the Second International, the split that gave birth to the Communist International. It was the inevitable culmination of the growiug antagonkm for years past between the revolutionists and the
opportunists in the world Socialist movement. It was directly caused
by the Second Internationat's support of the World War, by h
mtagonim to the Russizlll rtvolutimJ and by its betrayal of the
rtvolutiomty sbuggIes of the workers in Germany, Hungary and
other European countries at the close of Ehc war.
These great world events, of coursc, had profound repercwions
in the American S o & k Party. They brought to the breaking point
the longdeveloping tension between the Right and Lcf t wings of
the P a q and made it irnpi'ble for the mutualIy anhgonistic reformist and revolutionary clcmenrs to live within the one political
organization.
In the viral qutstion of the war, as we have seen, the Left wing
of the American Socialist Party had energeticdly oppased the whole
war-timc course of the Second International, condemned the action
of its s@
which supported the war, and strongly resisted America's entry into and prmcution of the war. But the Right wing
leaders of the Party, under cover of radical phrases, cornpromised
with the war situation in a typical reformist manner. This brought
to an acute stage the struggle between the two p u p s .

The controvetsy within the Party over the Russian revoIution
dtlso added fuel to the spreading conflagration. The rapidly growing
Left wing heartily supported the revolution and accepted its great
revolutionary lessons, indudimg the fundamenbt principles laid down
by Lenin. But the Right wing hated the Russian revolution as 'the
very victory symbol of the rtvolutionary spirit which they had fought
against for so many years in the American Socialist Party. They
rejected Lenin's teachings and placed the works af this greatest
revolutionist since Mam upon the banned books Sit, where they still
remain wtiI
day. All of which deeply embittered the Left wing.
T h e growing struggle between the Right and LEft wings of the
Party was further spread al?d intensified by Social-Democracy's
betrayal of the German revolution a t the end of the war through
the liquidation of the Soviets set up by the workers, soldiers
and &Ion. This treacherous action, which saved capitalism throughout central Europe and to which the present-day Hitler can trace
his power, met with the approval of the American Right wing and
the bitter h d t y of the Left.
Thus, in this series of great even& the Socialist Party, iu the
United States as well as abroad, was hopelessly split ideologically
by the reactionary course of its opportunist leaders. The long years
of struggle within the American Socialist Party, as in other eounm k , had come to a dimax. The two wings of the Party were at
open war with each other. It was the parting d the ways between
the two conflicting tendencies within the Party; between the policies
of class struggle and c h colhboration; between the revolutionists
who were determined to overthrow capitalism and the opportunists
who wanted to reform it,
Inevitably the deep ideologica1 split al~atook on organizational
form. And logically it was the Right wing, in line with its long
struggle to kill the revolutionary tendency, that took the actual
initiative in splitting the Party. Briefly, the break developed thus:
The rewolutionists, led by C. E. Ruthenberg and organized first in
the Socidist Propaganda League ((Boston, 19 15) and later in the
Left wing of the Socialist Party (New York, June, 19191, had
the support of the majority of the Party membership and in 1919
they elected 12 out of 15 members of the Nationd Executive Committee of the Socialist Party. But the Right wing, which controUed
the Party apparatus, repudiated this election and, in order to dom-
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hate the approaching Emergency Conwntion, suspended several
language federations and the whole Michigan State Party organization (much as the A. F. of L. Executive Councl lately ousted
the C.I.O.). At the convention itself in Chicago, August 30, 1919,

the Rights, with the help of the police, expeUed all known Left wing

delegates.
The split was thus completed. At last the Right wing had sue
ceeded in im historic aim of getting rid of the rtvof~~tionsry
dement
from the SociaIiit Party. But h e ruinous consequences to the Socialist
Party of this criminal expulsion of the Party's best forces, its very
life blood, were not long in showing thtmselverr. The 1919 split
turned out to be even more dimstrous to the S o d a b Party h n that
of 1912. Within a year the P W s membenhip dropped from 104,822 to 26,766* and by I927 it had fallen to but 7,425. The influence of the Party in the trade unions declined swiftly, and its vote
in the Presidential elections of 1928 (262,805) was hardy marc
than 25 per cent of its vote in 1920. Socidist representation in state
and local legislative bodies fell to but a smd fraction of its f m r
strength, The Party went generally into decay, and its once extensive
prnrs was almost wiped out. Its opportunist leaders, with tht Lcft
wing no longer on hand to remain them, completely abandoned dl
fight against the A. F. of L. reactionaries and joined with them in
their whole program of B. & 0.plan speed-up, labor banking, expulsion of Communists, anti-Soviet dander, etc. Thus, reduced
almost to zero in numbcrs, Muence and revolutionary principle, the
bankrupt Sociiist Party h k to the dregs the bitter cup of its
opportunist petty-bourgeois leadership, with their fatal reformist
p1icies and retntless war against the Left wing.

In conistquence of the 1919 split the flag of sochIism passed
from the hands of the Socialist Party. By twenty yern of opprtunism and fdure the Socialist Party petty-bourgeois leaders had
shown that they would make no fight for revo1utianary ~ l c d k m .
A new Socialist standard bearer, a revolutionary party, was n e e
sary and it was formed, the Communist Party.
In the summer o f 1921, the last detachment of the Left wing, the
Workem Council group (Engdah& TrPcbtenberg, F i h Fedemtiom, m)
dm quit the Sacidist Party.
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In previous spliw-1909, 1912--the exp~UedLeft wing became of its ideological undevelopment had either liquidated itsclf
into I.W.W. Syndicalism or dribbled back individually to the Sod i s t Party. But not so in 1919. T h e revolutionaries, acquainted
now with the principles of Leninism and educated by the great evens
of the war and the post-war revolutions, had matured*theoretically.
By 19 19 th Left wing had deared up, or was rapidly doing so, its
traditional semi-syndicalist errors on such questions as the role of
the state, the question o f the dictatorship of the proletariat, the seizure
of power, the role of the Party and the trade unions, ttc. fn short,
as Alex Bittelman says, it had advanced "from vague Left Socialism
and general proletarian militancy to the definite and d i d foundatians of Leninism".* Hence, on A u p t 3 1 and September 1, 29 19,
in Chicago, the split-off Ltft wing of the Socialist Party organized
itself into two Communk Parties. Between thm, howcver, the=
was little difference in principle; m, finally, two years later, cbty
fused into one united Communist Party.
Here is not the place for a history of the Communist Party.
The student can find this in BitteIman's Piftsm Y e m of the Cornm&t P q , Browder's Comm&m in & U&d SWS and W b
Is C o d m ? , Bhba's Hitorg of t h A e m Wm&g C h s
and my forthcoming book From Bym iu St&. In this study of the
Socialist Party I cannot give even an outline of the Communist
Party's development and policy.
Suffice it to sag that the Communist Party has based itself firmly
upon the dasffi struggle palicy which the Socialist Party throughout
its h h r y rejected. It has come forward energetically in the measure
of its strength the leader of the masses in their daily fights against
tht capitalist exploiters, and it has systematidly cultivated revolutionary M a b - L e n i n i s m among its own membership and mass
foUowing. And the general result of this correct policy of chs struggle is the present unity, growth and expanding influence of the
Communist Party.
As was to be expected, the development of the rehlutionary
P q in the great- stronghold o f capitalism was no bed of roses.
On the one hand, there had to be overcome, with the help of the
Communist International, the harmful scmi-Syndicalist sectarian
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conceptions inherited by the Left wing from the past, and this was
not accomplished and a revolutionary program developed without
sharp internal struggles and many serious error8 in j e practid
work of the Party. And, m the other hand, there had to be withs t a d the fierce attach of the capitalists and their agents, including
styere governmental persecution, widespread expulsion from the
trade unions and industry by reactionary union o f f i d working
with the boeises, ctc.
But the Communist P a q has prapered in spite of all thex
difficulties. It is now unified and healtby, and its membetship and
einflucnce arc constantly increasing. The P q ' s recent membership
@figures show: 1930--7,500; 1931-9,000;
1932-14,000;
1933
+18,000;
1934--26,000; 1935-30,000;
1936--41,000, plus
21 1,000 members in the Young Communist League or 52,000 in d.
I; Wherever the fight is hottest there tbt Communist Party is to
$c found organizing the toiiers'for a united front s m d against the
xploitexs, Not to mcnrion its mimy big struggles of past years, inPuding the long fight for amalgamation and the Labor Party; the
&ght against tbc B, & 0.pLn; the long struggle against corruption
and gangsrerim in the unions; the big 1930-33 fights of the unemployed; the many strike struggles of 1933-35, notably the San Franc k o strike, etc. The Communist Party, with its broad united front
policy, is phying rn active role on every front in the das auuggk.
Here I can mention only a few of the Communist Party's chief
current activities: At the present time it has mobilized the support
f at least S,000;000 workers and others in support of the Workers
ent Imrance Bill (HA. 2827). It is playing an importhe American Youth Congress, which at its convention
, July 3, 1936, had 1,400 dehgates representing a
0,000. The Communist Party is likewisc a vid
n League Against War and Fascism, a moved Congress in Cleveland in Januay, 1936,
070 delegates from 1,840 organizations of
Party's role was also one of significant
zation of the great united front National
-0,
February, 1935, of 1,817 &legates
0,000 members organized in trade unions, churches,
In all these united front movements the Commuc i a M i p n t . It is also taking an active pan in
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drive of the C.I.O. to organize the steeI, auto, rubber, and other mass production industries. In addition, the Party is
active in dewloping the Farmer-Labor Party movement. This was
acknowledged when, at the May 330, 1936, Farmer-Labor mnfcrence in Chicago, attended by prominent leaders of the Minnesota
Farmer-Labor Party, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, many
local h h r parties, etc., the Communist Par9 delegates were offiche prmnt big

cially mated.
A most important present activity of the Communist Party and
an evidence of its growing mass influence i its militant fight against
the suspension of the C.I.O.unions by the A. F. of L. Executive
Council. Up to the present writing 20 mate federations, 70 central
bodies, several international unions and hundreds of I d s have
protested the s u s p s b n . The rnof trade unionists are enraged
at the attempt of Green, Hutcheson .and Co. to split the labor movement, and the Communist Party has been very active in crystallizing
this m a s resentment into concrete action. The C.I.0, to date bas
bestirred itself very little in organizing this protest, and as for the
S a d k Parry, p'astratcd by its hesitant attitude and internal cham,
it has made virtually no dght whasaever to preserve the uniy of the
made union movement.

The growth and accomplishments of the Communist Party arc,
of course, very modest in -parkon
with the grtrt revolutionary
fggltg ahead. The P a y also still bas numy weaIcntsses and insufficiencies thrr haw to he corrected. But the important thing is that the
Party is on the right track, its fundamend program of class struggle is correct, its policies of the broad united front a n sucwssful, and
it is learning to appIy them effectively. This i amply proven by the
revalutionary Communist Party's record of growth and progress, in
compsrrison with the historical failure of tbt reformist Socialist Party.
The Communist Pnrty is becoming a major politid factor in the
country, while the Sodollist Party flounders along in crisis and decline. All of which goes to show that in the many long years' fight
between Rights and Lefts in the American revolutionary movement,
the Lefts were profoundly correct. Not dong the road of refarmism,
but of class struggle is the way the workers have to go to achieve

socialism.
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The Present Situation in the Socialist Party
The T

Hto thb
~ Left

S WE have seen, the present crisis in the Sm'dist Party is not a

A matter of recent development. It is piled-up result of long
years of wrong policy, of Right opporn~nism,of flagrant viahtion
the

-

of the Marxian class struggle policy which was fundamentally necessary to build the Socialist Party. But in the last three years there
has bcen something of a change in the Sociarkt Party's traditional
trend, That Party has shown fresh Left tendencies, and with them
some signs of renewed growth and activity.
Among the more marked of,these tendencies were an overhauling
of the Socialist Party's theoretical line, which resulted in the adoption of a more Left statement of principles at the Detroit, 1934,
convention; greater mass activity in the daily dass struggle, especiaUy among the unemployed; a growing tendency towards united
front movements with the Communist Party; a growth of the
Party's membership from 10,389 in 1931 to 19,121 in 1935 ; an
increase in the nationaI election vote to 883,341 in 1932, as against
262,805 in 1928; the defeat of the "OId Guard" as the Party
leadership, and the split with these clements at the Cleveland 1936
national Party convention.
A number of forces combined to bring about the new Left tendencies in the Socialist Party. The most decisive of these was the
great radicalization of the proletariat during the past few yea*
marked hy the many big struggles of the unemplgred, the huge
strike wave, the expansion of the unions, the growth of Labor
Party sentiment, the formation of the C.I.O., the widely spreading
mass discontent with capitalism as a system, etc. This basic mltss
radicalization movement naturally' had its effect upan the Socialst
Party by forcing it, especially from the pressure of its new proletarim members, into activity and into a more Left position. Another
very important factor in the Socialist Party's reawakening was the
shameful surrender of German Social-Democracy in face of the rise
of Hitler. This development, followed soon afterward hy the vic41
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tory of
in Austria, e x p e d the utter bankruptcy of
reformism and stimulated the Left tendency, not only in the Amcricm SociaIist Party but a h in many other parties of the Second
International. Another basic factor g r d y encouraging Left dcvelopmena in the Socialist Party was the continued success of the
Sovitt Union. The victorious Soviet government, the fruit of Communist policy, stands out in glaring contrast with the great defeat
of the whde line of the Socialist reformi= and consequently has
a revoiutionizing e&ct upon the proletarian members of the Socisllist Party. The growth of the popular front movement in Spain and
France in the past two yearn had a s i m k result. And, finally, rhe
growth of the American Communist Party, in contrast with the
crippled Socialist Party, ha.a big influence in developing Left sentiment among the Sodalist Party working class memben.
The Communist Party welcomes the new Left tendencies in the
Socialist Party for the good and obvious reason that every increase in
rtvdutionary stndment and organiation is f undamenbIly advantageous to the working &a and henee also to the Communist Party.
And in supporting the new Left wends in the Socialist Party a
central task is to analyze and evaluate them. The question before us
here is to learn whether in b new orientation the Socialist Party has
succeeded in overcoming the ruinous reformist policies which it pursued for a full generation and which have reduced it to its present
critid pition.

First let us consider the question of leadership. In previous pges
f have minted out what a disaster it waa for the Socialist Partv to
haw hkn dominated from t h ~outset $ a pettg-bourgeois leahership of lawyers, preachers, doctors, etc. They were the chief source
of the opprtunkm that hamstrung the Party throughout the years.
What has happened to the Socialist Party then in this respect in its
new Left turn?
Here we get an unfavorable answer. The situation remains substantially as before. True, a raft of these petty-bourgeois reformists
quit the Party in the 1936 Right wing split, formed the People's
Party and are now waging war against the Socklist Party. There
are new, young leaders developing in the Socialist Parry, but still the
Party is heavily dominated by non-proletarian elements. This was
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manifested at the CIeveland convention, with its many preachers,
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lawyers, etc., and it is also expressed by the petty-bourgeois make-up
of the Socialist Party National Executive Committee. Of the eleven
members in this committee four are lawyen, four are preachers and
two professors; only one is proletarian,.and he is a trade union official. Compare this S d i s t Party aon-working & leadership with
the Political Committee of the Camrnuaist Party which is composed
of I 1 members, dl proletarians.*
The Communist Party is not in principle against the memhrship
of middle class intellectuals, Such irrtellectds, when they art revolutionmy, have a great contribution to make ta the working dais
movement. Thig was brilltntly demonstrated by the life work of
Marx, Engels, Lenin and many others. But not by the type of opportunist intellectuals that have always shaped the policies of the American Socialist Party. Throughout iti, entire history t h e petty-bourgeois reformists have been a barrier in the way of the Socialist Party's
develuping a hedthp dass struggle policy and, despite the new Left
trends, that barrier still exists. The proletarhidon of the leadership of the Sodalist Party is a fundamend necessity in order for that
organization to develop towards a strong and revolutionary paw.
Next we turn to the question of plicy. I shall state the question
concretely: In previous chapters I have pointed out in considerable
detail, how the inability of the Socialist Party to huiId itself into n
strong revolutionary party during irs long history must be ascrlhd
to its failure to carry out a M-an
class struggle policy, that is, (a)
h failure to come forward aggrm'vely as the mas leader of the
working clw in its struggles for everyday cconomic and political
demands; (b) its failure to educate and develop a d i d body of
traitted Marxian revalutionaries as the backbone of the Party. Now
let us see whether or not the Socialist Party, with its recent Left turn,
has liquidated these two fatal reformist wealmeor sham indications o f doing so.
1. THEQUEST LO^

OF THE

DAILYMASS
~ U

G G L E ~

The answer to this question must be negative. The Socialist
Party's new line, especially in its Iatest developments, docs not make

*The

W i t Party National Exccutivc Committee is still mom uarep-tative
in thot it conhim no Negro, womw w youth membersi w h e m
in tbe Cammunisi Party top committee6 hcsc hmenta are f d y rep-tad.
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for increasing its leaderrhip of the masses in their daily economic and
political struggles. Throughout the history of the Socialin Party prior
to 1934, as we have seen, the openly Right wing reformist policy of
the Party, the tendency for the opportunist petty-bourgeois leaders
to soft-pedal and cclrnpromise aU struggles of the workers, was the
obstacle that prevented the Socialist Party from becoming the daily
mass leader of the proletariat. The Party has not, despite its new
turn, been able to free itself of this traditional reformism. It has
only sua:eded in adding new forms to its reiormist line,
The* new forms of reformism consist of a tendency towards
sectarianism. The sectarian tendency dresses itself up with many
revolutionary phrases, but it is opportunistic just the same. And it is
no less fatal to effective m a s work than open Right opportunism. It
has k e n especially manifest in the past year and has already done the
Sorhlist Party much harm. Unlw it k speedily corrected it will have
deadly effects upon the Sacialist Party by still further isolating it
from the life and struggles of the masses.

A . The Nekv Socialist P M I Sect&
~

Reformism

There is at present great theoretical confusion in the Socialist

a

Party, what with groups of ('Old Guard" reformists, Thornadtes,
Hoanites, "milhnts", Trotskyites, Lovestoncites, and a minority of
developing Leninists all advocating their respective flicies and
struggling for control of the Party, whik the split-off "Old Guard"
makes war from the ourside. T h e dominant voice in the inncrparry cham is that of Norman Thomas. He ia the outstanding theoretical leader of the Party and bc is especially active in injecting the .
new elements of sectarianism into the general reformist line of tht
Party, His program boils down to a curious combination of Right
and "Left" sectarianism superimposed upon a basic structure of the
old discredited class collaboration of the Second International.
It is not surprising that there should develop sectarian tendencies
of revolutionary phrasemongering among the Socialist Party membership. Unquestionably, the proletarian members of the Socialist
party-inthe& new eft mood'want to make a revolutionary organization of their Partv.
training
,- but with no solid M-an
" as a
background, they drift off into mere revolutionary phnse-making
instead of making a sound revolutionary policy. It is what k n i n
called the infantile slckness of "LzFtism". This tendency is worsened
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apportunlst leadership of the Party which
workers' revolutionary m d s into mere
radical phr&-making and thus avoids real mass struggle. They continue their opportunist line in a different form.
At first glance it may seem astonishing tbat a pronounced advoate of the new sectarian tendency should be Norman Thomas,
who hitherto has always been an open Right opportunist. But such
16
Left" vagaries are not uncommon on the part of Sorialist middleclass intellectuals all over the world. I need only refer to the case
of the ultra-opportunist C . E. R u s d joining with Debs ia warning
againse opportunism m the S o d i s t Party in their pamphlet Dmgw
A h d , or the c w of the reformist Prank Bohn lining up with Bill
b y w o o d in the 19 12 inner-party fight, or the recent instance of
A. J. Muste, who in a few years completed the cpde of p a c h e f - progressive trade unionist-Left Sodah+Tmt&yite and then b
a
a
to preacher a g n . Right apportunists can easily fly over to "Lefts'
sectarian pitions.
The sectarian danger in she Socialist Party was greatly increased
by that Parry's recent absorption of the T r o w group, Just at
the time when these counter-revolutimarv elements were being
proved to be terrorkts and &s
the S&st
Party saw fit
titkc them to its W. But it will inevitably pay dearly for this
m w e in l a of s t r e n d and influence. The Tro*tes,
who are
finding easy pickings i;! the confused, chaotic &idkt Party, are
tending greatly to turn that organization into an anti-Communist,
anti-Soviet sect. This will drive the best worker elements out of the
Socialist Party and will furtber weaken its contare with the masses.
Not long since the French Socialist Party also made the mistake
of swallowing the noisome Trotsky group, but it soon bad to relieve
iwIf of the poisonous, indigestible mw, and the American Suciah
Party will have to do the -c
if it is to develop into a healthy prty.
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B. Utocler~stimdiwof I-diade

D n d s

Now let us look at the practical app11catianof the Socialist Party's
new mixture of sectarianism and Right reformism, of which Thomas
is the great champion. The h e m of Thomad theorizing is to the
effect chat inasmuch as capitalism is now breaking down the fight
for parrial economic and political demands is rehtively unimportant
and that the immediate iswe upon which dl attention shauld be con-

centrated is the basic revolutionary question of socialkn versus caw
talism. His pition, in subwance, is &at the worken cannot ~gtkfy

their most immediate needs or w
c
t their mosr eIementllry rights
short of establishing a socialist society. Thomas says, "The immediate
demand of the SacSists is socialism."*
Now d this sounds yery revolutionsy, especially coming from
N o r m Thornas who only three years ago was enthused over the
''steps toward socialism" of Roosewlt. But actually it is only radical
phrascmongering. Its general effect is to weaken the struggle of the
workers and to pIay into the hands of the bosses. Its continuance
will make havoc with what membership and standing the Socialist
Parry still has left.
i'h~mab' playing down of immediate partial demands gae~
counter to the whole need and trend of the revolutionary movement
His line is one. of mere agitation, not struggle. The fight for
demands is the starting point for all revolutionary struggle. And
never did rhey play such a &a1 role as they da now, with the workers'
civic, working, and living standards being so viciously attacked by
the growing fascist reaction. As thc Communist Party carrectly
a militant defense of the workers' immediate interem is the
firse condition fbr the &olelopent of the struggle against capitalism
as a system. It is only in such fights thar the workers can develop
the necessary undezstanding, confidence and organization. When
Thomas puts out his slogan, "If reform is the way out, hetter bck
with the Raosevelt administration", and then backs this up by softpedaling the fight far the immediate issues confronting the toiIing
masses and by c o n c e n ~ t h gupon mere agitation for the establishment of smialism, he ahdons the prcsentday fighting field of the
revolutionary movement and reducm the whole struggle for socialism
to an empty abstraction. He not only undermines the presentday
fight of the workers but the ultimate aims of rht working class as
well. In the name of sociaIism he hamstrings the fight for socialism.
And the effect of it all upon the Sotialist Party is still further to
isolate it f ram the life and struggles of the masses and thus to push
it along the fatal road of sectarianism. It is d$o water on the mill
of the counter-revolutionarp Trowites who are stmgg1hg ta control the Sociakt Party,
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C. The Retreat Befwe Fascism
Consequent upon his failure to ptrceive the fundamental importance of the fight for immediate demands in the development of the
revolutionary struggle in general, Tbomas abandons the field in the
face of advancing f a s c i i . With his consmnt h q h g upon the one
string of "socialism versus capitalism" he quits the red revolutio~~ary
battle which, in its p m t preliminary stages, is now being waged
around the central question of " d e m w a ~Venus fascism". Is this
not srs clear as day in France and Spain? There the workers and their
allies, who in their overwhelming m a s would remain unresponsive
to sterile and academic talk such as Thomas' about estabhhing
mialism forthwith, are nevertheless drawn into rtvolutionsry activity bp their fight against the attacks of the f k i s t s upon their
present divic, working, and living standards. Their movement begins
as a defensive fight for the most elementary immediate needs, thtir
wages, their right to organize, the national independence of their
countries, etc., but it soon passes over to a muntcr-o&mke struggle
for major objecti~esmaking definitely towards a revolutionary clash
with capitalism.
Thus in F m c e tbe workers and their d i e s were not content
simply with setting up the Blum government as a defense against
f&sm but carried their counter-off-ve
much further, adding
3,000,000 new members to the trade unbns, securing wage incfesses,
shorter hours, vacations with pay, etc., ac. And in S+ this whole
revolutionary trend iR even more marked. Who can doubt but that
the masses in these countries, s t h g from th& defense of their
democratic rights and developing their counter-offensive, have made
huge strides in the direction of the find struggle for s o d k u ?
And the same general rule applies to the United States. When
Thomas does not see the question of progress versus reaction, of
democracy v e m faxism, as the h u e of immeditc struggle, he
faits to see the present-day revdutionary struggle in general and
he lives in a realm of reformist sectarian abstractions.
Where Thomas' blindness on the issue of democracy versus
fascism leads to in actual practice is shown by the tragically r i b lous padtion of the Socialist Party in the 1936 Presidential election
campaign, which is still going on as I write this. T
he situation is tbat
the Liberty LPague and other great capitakt interests, which embody
the rcal threat of f&
and of which such figures as Cwghh,
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Smith, Talmadge, etc., are satellites, are bitterly opposed to Roosevelt's concessions to the toiling masses, meager though they were,
and they are almost solidly behind Landon. Roosevelt has served
them welI. His proudest boast is that he saved the capitalist systtrn
by the New Deal. But the big utploiters are determined to find an
even more convenient instrument for putting across their ultrareactionary program, a program which inevitably Ieads in the direction
of faxism.
It is clear that the Republican candidate Landon. with his falseface of liberalism and his ;utelage by the fascist ~ e a r k is, the spkesman of the main fascist danger in this country. Although he
himself is not definitely a fascist and while his victory would
not result immediately
the establishment of fascism, it would,
nevertheless, undoubted1y stimulate en~rmouslythe employers' reactionary offensive and greatly facilitate the growth of h i s t tendencies. In line with the realities of the situation, therefore, the
Communist Party has correctly singled out Landon as the chief
expressian of the fascist menace and urges his defeat. But this
by no means implies endwmcnt of Roostvelt. O n the contrary, the
Communist Party mints out that with his constant serviee to reactionary finance-&tal
Roosevclt is an ardent defender of capitalism and is no barrier to £ a s k . It advocates the formation of a
united front anti-fascist Farmer-Labor Party and, in the absence
of such a prty, in the present elections, it-calls upon the masses
to vote far the Communist Party candidaes, Browder and Ford.
But Thomas can see no fascist danger in Landon. Quite the
reverse: he concentrates his main fire against Roosevelt and gives
direct support to Hearst's mm, Landon. The fascist-like election
srrategy of the Republican Party and its heavy financial backers is,
through the candidacy of Landon, to put somethhg of a liberal
face upon their reactionary program and thus to delude the ceases.
But Thomas, d e a d of joining with the Communises, trade unionists, liberals, etc,, in exposing this dangerous demagogic trick, praceeds to give it practical support.
'llamas aids the capitalist demagogy by absolving Land011 of any
taint of fascism and accepting this pseudo-liberalism at its face value.
He assails the Communists for ascribing a fascist tendency to Landon
and he can we the trend towards fascism only in such figures as
Coughlin, Smith,etc. Says Thomas, "The fascist demagogue will talk

.
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like Huey Long or maybe like LC&,
bur not like Landon or
hw".*This attitude constitutes direct aid to the fascist Hearst's
candidate, as it tends ta disarm the masses and lure them into the
. demagogic
mp set for them by fascist-minded big capital.**
But Thomas gws further than thi& He a h undertakes to cleanse
t Ladon's big financial supprtem themselves of any suspicion of
fh.
Tbis he does with doubly fdacious argument, Firstly, he
,
presents the deadly reformist illusion that fascism is a movement
of the middle dm,***instead of its being & d y
the movement
of finance capital, with the mid& class serving as its -1;
and
secondly, he makes the ridiculous assertion that the Republican Party,
the party of monopoly capital, instead of tending on towards fw
n ~ n h oactually
~ trying
~
to turn back
; c b and further r
the wheels of time and return to the period of relatively free mmptitim, to the individ*
capitalh of the nineteenth century.
He declares, KLandon, or the forces and inter&& behind him which
!
are arongcr than Landon, arc in the strict sense of the word red o ~ They
. want to go baeg to 4m older capital&''.**** Thus,
Thomas would have the workers believe that finance capid presents
of fascism, but is actuallp a barrier against it.

:
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Consequent upon this absurd analgsis, Thoma arrives at the
condusion that it makes no difference whether R m v e l t or Landon
is elected. But in reality the weight of his argument f avo= Landon,
and gives him direct support. Indeed, Thomas finds a characteristicdy ridiculous reason for the election of Landon when be says: "Conceivably a Ladon victory might put iron in labor's blood."****
When Hearst, to ekct Landon through a Red scare, lyingly alleged
that the Communim were supporting Roasevelt, Thomas at o n a
rushed into print and seconded Hearst's charge. Small wonder then
Quoted in D d y W*,

** T&om&
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of b d o n ' a demo&
prttam of l h d i a u wan
evidenced by bin much publidzed letter to Landon &g
bim to atate m m
@y
hiq @tion towarch Iabor. For thin arvice to Landon, Tbomm t ~ l s
h d yp
d by Hcawt m d the whole R q u b l i ~ ~pn m and randy condemned by many when of f i t
***UThe mtialthingahutfoocirmin Bumpa i that it bamiddlw
claw movement, d h c d n d y os mneb agaht intornationd )mnkcn or
fintocrab M again* o r g a n i d w o r h n d f tk
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that Hearst, the cbief American fascist, should quote him approvingIy
in hi3 great chain of papers. And it is significant that with the R e
publicans in the election campaign fiercely denouncing not only
Browder, but also such people as Frankfurter, Tugwell, Icke~,
Wallace, Lewis, Hillman, Dubinsky, and even bosevelt him&,
as dangerous Communists, they exempted Norman Thomas entirely
from their attack. In Mineoh, New York, the Republican dv authorities refused a public building for a meeting of the American
Labor Party (to which 450,000 New York trade unionists are
n-ted)
on the ground that it was Communistic, but they freely
dlowed the use of the hall the following night to the Socialist Party,
with Norman Thomas as speaker.
T h e 1936 national elections constitut~the sharpest
dioisions
in American history. On the one side, there is the greatest aggregation of capital that has ever backed any American politid prty and,
on the other, an unprecedented concentration of the toiling masses.
Although the o p m g dass line-up and program are as yet by no
means complete and char-cut, this election fight amounts to the first
red battle betwen the forces making for fascism and t h e fighting
against it. And in thiD important situation the Malist Party finds
h l f on the wrong side of the barricade. For this it is h a d y paping dearly in Iessened prestige and influence, and it is being e m d
still further to the Trotskyrte poison within its times.

The new trend in the Saeiallst Party has not given that Party
a revolutionary peace policy. True, the Socialist Party makes a great
show of r a d i b in its attitude towards the war that now threatens
to deluge the world anew with blood. But in reality its policy in this
vital matter is only its traditional reformist line, with the new seewian trimmings. Its wrong attitude stands in the way of the
Socialist Party doing real anti-war service m d of its developing
m a s leadership on this fundamental h e . The mtmbefship of the
Socialist Party are, of course, genuinely in favor of p a c e but their
Party's program is not r true peace policy. And this wrong policy in
the srruggle against war is made dl tbe worse by the grow'ng influence of the Trotskyites in the Socialist Party.
Briefly, the war situation is this: Fascist Germany, Japsn and
Italy in an hiimperialist drive to acquire markets, natural resources
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m d colonies, and ta smother their own internal crisis, are developing
a great bloc for a war ofiensive against various other countries as
m i o n dictates, among them the capitalist democracies of France,
England, the United States, Spain, Czechoslovakia, etc., as well as
against the Soviet Union. It k a basidly different wltuation from
that prevailing on the eve of the 1914 World War. At that time
two mutually warlike and aggresive groups of imperialist powers
confronted each other; but now the capitalist democracies, colonies
and sadist U.S.S.R., whicb all want peace, are definitely on the
defensive in the tace of the militant h i s t o&nsive.
Should the fascist a g g m r s succtcd in their war plans of mas
daughter and subjugation, it would be a crushing blow to liberty in
every counny. Their murderous attack aims to extinguish all
semblances of labor organization and civil rights in Europe and to.
reduce h e living standards of the toiling m e s to c d i e levels;
it also menacw the @tical independence of many countries, and its.
most central objective is to drown the Soviet governmtnt in the
greatest bloodbath in h h oy. T h e fascht offensive threatens the very
existence of modern civilization and ie succcss would be a major
h t e x KO the human race.
In the face of this ulm&gerous situation the Soviet Union
leads the struggle for the maintenance of peace. It seeks to develop
a combined defensive by the mialist and democratic forces of the
world, on the basis of a program of d d v c security, to stop tbe
war which the fa&& arc preparing so delibermly. And more and
more the world's labor movement and the democratic countries are
rallying t o this program. But this struggle has still greater impkatiom than that of saving the world from a horrible slaughter. It
dso dovetails with the fight of the revoludonary movement for
wialism at the present h e . Should the combined pace forces be
able to prevent the war it means that the advance of sodim thereby
will be greatly facilitated in every county; and if they have t*
' defeat m i l i d y the fax&
in a war forced by the latter it will
surely be a prelude to proharim revolutions in many countries. The
struggle to prestrw democracy and to maintain peace is also, for the
toiling maws, the fight fot sociaism.
But the sa recently super-revolutionary Thomas will have none
of this. He r e p u d h s all efforts to force the American government
to take a stand with other democracies against rhe fascist aggr-

and he like& rejects this policy far Europ~annations, With a
pseudo-radical gesture he sweep away th correct revolutionary
strategy of the Communist International and thE Soviet Unian.
Echoing the "Red imperialism'' &den of Gutsky and the lie of
Hider that the U.S.S.R. is the r e d sour- of the war danger,
Thomas denounces the Communists and other advocates of collective security agaiast the fascist b a r h as "crusaders for a new
holy war". He snecrs at the pace struggle led by the Soviet Unian
to halt the war-making faxists as being rncreIy preparations for "a
' g o d war between capitalist nationssy.* Then he plumps for the
American bourgeois imperiaIist policy of " n e e and "isolation",
the policy mask behind which American c a p h l h hides its aggres-
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sive slims

Thomas' policy of ''keeping out of it" is, in plain Englisb a
shameful surrender before the attack of Hirler, Mussolini &
It is an abandonment of the embattled revolutinnary labor movement of Europe. Thomas' determination not to actively assist the
workers of Europe in case of a fascist-made war he justifies by the

k.

following puerile argument:
' I t should be rtmemkrcd that there is DO particular virtue in
helping an Tnnotent' nation [one of tho- attacked by thc farcisbWZ.F.1 by enabling the du Pont family to d l powder to them at
a great praftt."+*

T h e readiness of Thomas to betray the Soviet Union in ease
of war is clearly shown in the following disgraceful statement:
"b not R u d a today strong enough to take eaxc of h d f without asking workem in other lmda in her behalf to accept the terror
and futility of one more 'good' war?"***

The American imperialkt policy of "holation", which Thomas
accepes with a ffauriah of much radical phraseology, cannot prevent
war nor keep the United States out of war if and when it comes.
"The way to keep America out of war is to keep war out of the
world", correctly says the Communist Party. &d this can ody
be done by an organized struggle for peace on the part of tbt anti-
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war forces of the world against thc maddog fasdst war-makers.
The great p e n t &I of the revolutionary movefnent is to mobilize
the workers and their allies for this w g l e against war, and it is
a task tbat the Communist
are everywhere loyally fualling.
But the Socialist Party, wirh its "stag out of it" A m e k capitalist
n
e
e theories, has abdicated mass hadership in this struggle for
pace and is objectively lending suppod to the fascist war-makers in
Europ and this country.

~~

The matter of breaking the -6
away from the two capitalikt
pdcs and building a great Fxrmer-Lhr Partp is a fuadamenta
necesdq to combat the advance of reaction and f
h in thim tomtry. And never was the sentiment so strong as now mong the
workers for such a prty. But hesitan9 and delay in the matter are
highly dangerous. Because the A. F. of L. trade union bodies, upon
whom the principal responglBil3y f a for launching such a party,
have failed to act we see huge masses of discoutenttd workers, small
farmers, erc., f a n g undet the control of the Coughlins, Lemkes,
Townsends, etc., in their incipient faxkt third party which is o p d y
d i n g Landon reactha& in the election campaign. It is the gretrt
task of the Farmer-Labor Party, the A m h form of the People's
Front, to prevent the huge toiling mwho arc seething with discontent from being trapped by reacrionary and f&
demagopm
sad to give t h e masses a powerfill anti-fascist politid weapon. It is
because of t b e e vital comiderations that the Communist Party is a
constant and militant fighter for the establhhent of the FarmrrLabor Party.
But here again on this basic issue the S o d i s P a r q still fdows o
reformist policy highly detrimental to its dovelnpment of mass leadership and effective struggle. In previous pages f have pointed out that
the Soc;alist Party with its preacherdoctor-hwyer leadership followed for many years a sect&
anti-hbor
policy that w a
~ t r o u to
s the Sod&
Party's development as a mass proletarian
For a few years there was a tendency t4 correct tbis dkstrow
policy, but now the kcidkt Party, with its outbreak of seiecEaiian
phrasemaking, is falling again into the b i s t o h l m h k c of an
anti-labor party pol*.

m.
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It is true that the Socialist Party does lip service to the question
of the Farmer-Labor Party, but that is about as far as it goes. In
practice the Socialist Party folIows a h e inimical to the FarmerLabor Party. This manifests itself by the S o d k t Party's systematic
opposition to a11 steps leading towards the actual formation of the
Farmer-Labor Party. It hinders the Farmer-Labor Party by insisting
upon an unduly radical program for it and by putting forth pirn*c argumenB that there is as yet no mass basis for such a party.
Besides, the Sociaiist Party takes little or no active part in the now
necew ry preliminary agitation and organization s t e p t h e buiIding
of Iocal and state parties, Farmer-Labor Party conferences, etc.and often actualy reresists thee movements. Thus the Socialist Party
declined even to attend the important Chicago, May 30, conference
called by the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party and it assumed an attitude of sharpest hostility towards the A m e r i w Labor Party of New
York, which is an important indication of the trend of the Committee for Industrial Organization towards a national Labor Party.
And highly significant of its sectarian attitude, the Socialist Party in
its most important 1936 election campaign document, the Party fitform, does not even r i s e the question of the Farmer-Labr Party,
an omission which puts forward the emaciated and half-lifeless
Socialist Party, as the only political prspective, organizationaIly
speaking, for the American working c h and its allies,
T h e Socialist Party never, a t any time, fuIIy freed itself from
the harmfuI illusion which it held for many years that the Labor
Party was a. rival prty, a cornperitor to the Socialist Party. And
now, with the new wave of sectarianism in the Socialist Party,
this long-imbedded wrong conception gains fresh ground. This is
clearly shown by the platform omission of the question of the
Farmer-Labor Rrty. It is aleo evidenced by the fact that at the 1936
convention of the Socialist Party 64 delegates (against 119) voted
opposition in principle to the Labor Party. The baneful and growing
influence of the Trotskyites in the Socialist Party greatly increases
this anti-Farmer-Labar Party trend. Thus the Socialist Party raises
a high barrier of sectarianism thar blocks its way to mass influence
and leadership on the fundarncntzllly important issue of the FarmerLabor Party.

T o the foregoing instances of sectarian trends and openly oppdftunist hang-over policies from the past that still remain in the mass
work of -the Socialist Party many others of similar character could

be added. The same narrow line is to be observed increasingly in the
Socialkt Party's work in the trade unions, among the unemployed,
in the youth activitk, among the sbarecropptis, etc. And the general
eEect of it all is, during the past year or so since the sectarian trends
have become more pronounced, to cut away the Socialist Party's
already greatly weakened mass influence and to reduce still further k
badly shattered membership.
It is characteristic of Norman Thomas' rok in the Socialist Party
that, with his great show of radical phrssernoagefhg, he should find
the way to distort inta a sterile sectarianism the Socialist Party prole-

r

,,

tarian membership's desire to make their Party truly revolutionary,
In every imporcant situation Thomas seems to have the unhappy
faculty of finding the way to inaction llnd surrender. He is a>
confirmed prophet oS pessimism and defeatism. But fortunately his
non-fight way is not the way of tbe masses. For them the class

struggle is not merely a matter of philosophical speculation; their
very lives and 11h&s are at stake, and they will fight norwithstanding
the surrender advice of Thomas.
Many examples might be cited of Thomas' non-struggle policies,
Thus, for instance, when Roosevelt promulgated hi N.R.A. Thomas
promptly called upon the workers not to strike. Happily, however,
they disregarded his counsel of e v e reliance upon Roosevelt and
carried through successfuIly one of 4 e greatest strike waves in
American history. Again, in his book, As I SGGIt, Thornas was at
great pains to show, in his defense of purely parliamentary tactics,
that armed action by the workers has been rendered obsolete and
imp0ssliIe by the development of the airplane and other modern
military weapons. But the workers of Spain, against whom the greatbutk of the trained army revolted, are now giving a glorious negative
t o Thomas' surrender propaganda. Thorns' abandonment of thy,
European workers' fight for peace is aka rr non-struggh policy that
the masses will reject, And now in his new book, After the Mew
Deal-Whrort Norman Thomas not only sees fascism as inevitable
in the United States following t h e next serious ecofiomic crisis,* bu&
_
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more or less universal after the world war that is now brewing.
But again the workers will disappoint this monumental pessimism
of Thomas. They will never accept his inevitability-of-fascism
theories. T h e y will h v e a big word to s y before f e r n can possibly
succeed in this country, and what &t
can doubt that the next
world war, instead of being folIowed by a spread of fascism, will
give birth to s new wave of proletarian revolutions that may well
crack the capitalist system all over Europe?
Thomas' new sectantananism
has im roots in this basic @rnism,
in his glaring lack of faith in the fighting ability of the working
elm and i& allies. His whole conception is an escape from the hard
realities md severe bsks of the &a struggle into the easy realm of
glittering radical generalities. But it is a path that the working
vffiil never tread. It will not fit itself into Thomas' narrow sectarianism, defeatism and crass opportunism. On the contary, it will forge
ahead dong its line of militant mass struggle and leave the Socialist
Party, if that Party prsists in its present policies, sitting in steriie
isolation.

In the foregoing pages we haw seen chat the SocizlIist Party, with
its new turn, has not succeeded in develo$ng a policy that would
bring it forward in a Ieading position among the workers and other
soiling masses in their everyday struggle against the capimh exploiters. Thus it still f a 3 in the Grst essential for the establishment
of the c h straggle policy that is fundarnentdy necessary in order
to build a strong revolutionq party. Now let us see what the SodaIist Party is doing with regard to the wond essential of such a

class struggle policy-the bu~Minpup of a strong body of MarxistLeninist u n d e m d h g in and around the Party. Here, again, as we'
shall see, our question will receive a negative answer : the S o c i d t
Party is also not succeeding in this most basic need.
Prior to 1934, the authori~tivepronouncement of the Socklist
Party analysis and policy wss the statement of principles adopted in
the Party convention of 1924. Thip was a typical social reformist
documen't of the period; it might well have &la the basic program
of any of the parries of the Second International. It was more con-
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1920 statement (which was adopted undeiL
-the inluene of the Russian Revolution and the great post-war up
,
heavals) and it contained alI the theoreticd misconceptions and
;
. opportunist policles &at have led to the pram'cal bankruptcy of the
..
Second International in the face of the Russian Revdution on the
',-one h d and the rise of f&SEi9m on the orher.
A
I
The 1924 Socialist Party statement, a product of the M i d g e
"boom" priad, was not a progrm of proletarian revolution, but
-I I of the gradual growth of capitalism mto w c h l b . The document '
rejects the M a 6 analysis of the capitaliSt mtc as the instrument
;I of the bourgeoisie and the revolutionary n e e for setting up
J thc dictatofthip of the prdcmd-bstead
it is based upon the opportunist theory that the prestnt state i a democratic d e ' s Btate by
means of which radrlirm w be builc The 1924 pra h
holds forth not a Msndaa pe-ctive
of c h struggle. dminating; servativtivr even &an the

.

.

priatm'' without campensation, but the Bernsrein conception of c h - .
.:
collaboration, the conquest of the state by peaceful means and tbe
purehast of the major industries from the capitalist owners.
The Detroit, 1934, statement of principles, written as I bsve ,
pinted out under the pressure of the great American strike wave
of the early Roosevrlt years and in face of rhc bankruptcy of the
German Socialist Party before Hitler's attacks, broke sharply with : .
the extreme Right reformist S o d a b Party conception of .1924.
The new program was still full of confusion and far from being
revolutionary, but it was nevettheless a big advance over the pre,1

-

1

&us document.

IA

The 1934 program rejected the reformist theory of the eaph
I,
talist "people's stat^''^ began to sptak of the "bogus d e m o c r q of
-1
- capitalism", and made a confused approach to the question of the. , I
d i e t a ~ ~ ~of
l i pthe proletariat by vague theorizing a b u t a future I
"workers' demodracy". The program also cast grave doubts on the -!
d c a c y of purely democratic and legal methods o f struggle and I
declared that it was prepared if necessvg to "carry the revolutionary
struggle into the camp of the enemy". It also took a more militant:. , I
stand against war, pronouncing itself in favor of "massed war re4 L
sistance", and it made a more correct estimate of the first s o d k t
- "
state, the U.S.S.R. This relatively k
ft program was adopted
the Detroit convention only after a f i e m resistpncc by the "Oid4;:
--7'#
-- Guard" leadership, who denounced it as Communistic.
57
- 1 .
I
- I
1

1

- ..

..I

rn

. I

. --.. -

I

I I X ,

,

The Detroit, 1934, program represented progress in the direction of a revolutionary basis for the Socialist Party's work. But the
Cleveland, 1936, Sacialisr Patty convention took some step barkward by subantially watering down the Detroit document.
Throughout its history the Socidkt Party has opportunistidly
swayed back and forth in its statements of its basic principles, varying
them widely according to the temporary moods of the m a a s .
The Party was at the time no longer feeling the heavy mass
pressure &at it had experienced in 1934, so the 1936 Socialist
Party convention, as always dominated by lawyers, preachers, doctors and other middle & intellectuals, who were alarmed at their
own radicalism of 1934, characteristically decided to remove
&me of the "objcctionable'' features of the 1934 program.
They also hoped that this ' ' e o n ~ n "would placate the enraged
-&OldGuard" Right wing of the Parry led by Louis Waldman, Abe
Cahan, James Oneal, then aa the verge of a split.
Tbc Detroit convention had before it a proposed program submitted by the Left wing at the Socialkt Call Institute, a document
which, despite its many clemtntary theoretical errors, would have
brought the So&&
Parry substantially n m r to a c m a Leninist
position.* Bur the convation rejected this document and, instead
of continuing the Party's progress Lefmard, pushed it off again to
the Right. The 1936 convention toned down the 1934 declaration
of priacipks by modifying several key paragraphs in a manner considerably minimizing the necessity for a program of militant class
4truggle surd placing more reliance upon bourgeois democracy. These
retreats to the Right Norman Thomas calls an Uimprovement".**
In considering the status of the Smiabt Party with regard to
revolutionary theory attention must be focused u p its leader,
N o r m Thomas. In reality, so great is his influence that the Party
k guided far more by what he says than by its formal declaration
of principles. And Thomas' whole theoretical Iine makes against a
revolutionary program ; it worb directly count- to the development
of a body of M d n revolutionary understanding in and around
the W s t Party; it cultivates reformism and s e c ~ n i s mand it
creates favorable conditions for the growth of Trotskyism.

*

For a detailed analysh of thi document and aa &tc
of &c p c d
theoretical' *tion
of the Socialk Party, e A l e x Bitptlman'a pamphlet,
Gomg b f t , Workers Libmry PubLisb~rqNew York,
Afm t& Nsec Ded-Wkac? p. 221.

*
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The viewpoint of Norman Thomas is a melange of "Left"
ilihcratism acd Bernstein revisionism, heavily tinctured with TrotskyI 'ism,and this incongruous mixture he calls acsocklism". Thomas, the
:present "Left" leader of the Socialist Party, is even Lxs a Mamist
''than was the former K i opportunist Old Guard party head,
Hillquit. Not only is the basic theoretical work of the great Mamisrs,
Lenin and Stalin, rejected completely by Thomas, but he aIso blithely
-chdtnges offhand even the most fundamental principles of Manr
land Engels. Thus, for cmmple, in a few lincs mnd with a wave of
;the hand, he casually brushes aside the Marxian conceptions of
,hisaorical materialism and of the dm struggle and a h the Marxian
,theories of value.

..

&we thing do not prooc that all this old world nee& h
to accept Marxiem with i~ materialist wimption of U r y , c h
c o d i n and &my of valwm
I

,

"Not only ie the ccllaccp: of ,
fd&mniition
tu
the weight M
d often put u p n it but so ia tbe mare w h a n d y

restatement of the traditional reformist line of the Swialist Party,
with the addition of his new sectarian tendencies. It contradicts even
the relatively mild "Left" line of the 1934 Party statement of
principles. Thomas shows in it that the great lessons of the R d o
Revolution, the rise of fascism a d the bankruptcy of the oppor~unist
fine of the Second International are quite lost upon him in the mamr
ofworking out of a SOcjaliPt plicy in the United States.
In Thomas' latest book we find a repetition of the old social
reformist avoidance of mass class smggle and the customary apporrunkt conception of the gradual growth of capitalism into wdkm.
He even repeats the antique and discredited reformist plan of buying the industries from the capitah, as he propes "to offer some
comptnsation to the expropriated owners".+* Thomas retains a childlike faith in the efficacy of capitalkt democracy as the means of
accomplishing sodahm, He completely disregards the lessons of
fascism in Europe, which prove mnclusively what Mam and L d
said many yeam ago* that the capitalists, including the militant

*

A&'s

W q O* pp. 133 and 138.
D a L W M f p. 163.

** dftw h New

I
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brand, win never d a w themselves to be ousted through
the workeft and their d i c e merely obtaining prliamcntarp majorities, but wiU resort to arms to defend their rulership, Thomas pins
h i hopes in the American a p h l i s t democraq (with a bit of parchmg up here and thtl*e). He is thus an ardent advocate of American
exeeptimlism. Just how little a revolutionist Thomas is, despite all
hia pother a h t mchlism, was shown by a revealing statement he
made in June, 1936, to The N m YOTR Tiplod$:

Am&

q n this e~tmtrywe want no dictatodip, wc want no revolution,
are ample constitutiod m
ya of bringing about tbt change
[to &dim-WZ.F.1
iu a pcaccfd and legal m ~ ~ e r . ~

&re

From all the foregoing it is clear that the Socialist Party, as a
party, is not &g
itself upon rcvoluhary thcorp; and as Lcnin
smys, without revolutionary theory there ean be no revolutionary "
movement. With its p m n t hkl of conflicting group reformist
t h e s l d Guardism, militantism, Lovestoneism, and counterrevoIutionary Trots-,
the So&&
Party does not develop a
program of militant daiIy m a s struggle nor can it build up the indispensable core of revolutionary Marxian fighters. What progress
it is malting towards these e e n w gods coma from the p r e m ~ t
of the incipient LministSdinh minority in the Smiatist P q .
Especially d o e Thomzs' mish-mash of spporhtnist Lhcorizing staad
in the way of the idcdogical advance of the W i s t Party. T o become a revolutionary party the Socialist Partp would have to overcome i~ s M o w opportunkt theories and bm its policies firmly upon
the study and ppph of the work of the great revolutionary
leaders of the working -Marx,
Engcls, Lcnin and S u n .

.

A fundamental aspea of the fdurc of the new leadership of
the Socia$t Party to cultivate the revolutionary force of the working
cIass is its hostility towards the united front. In this and-united front
attitude there arc elements of the new S&&t
Party s e c t a m ,
but the main constituents of it are remnants of the traditional war
of the opportunistic Socialist Parq leadership against the Left wing.
The question of unity is now one of most burning necessity
to the working h in view of the growkg offensive of the fascist
reaction. At its recent Seventh WorId Congress in Mmow the

,

I

Communise International understcad this clearly, saying: "At the
present historical stage it is the main and immediate task of the intrnational labor m o m e n t to establish the uniocd front of the
workiug k''
The Communist Parties all over the world are working actively
to develop such unity of labor's farces. And that they are not striving
in vain is demonstrated by the great united front movemenrr in,
France, Spain, Austria, Italy, ctc. In Brst h e , dl these movements
are based upan formal united front agreements between the W i s t
and Communist P
&
The need for unity within the ranks of MKUh also acute in the
United States, and the Communist Party is the leading fighter for
the united front. As part of its campaign for an eventual broad
united People's Front of labor and its allies in the Farmer-Labor
Party it attadtts great importance to a general united front with
the Sociakt Party, based upon a program of struggle for immediate
demands, but also looking forward to rhe amalgamatian of the two
partus into one organization on the basis of a rcvdutionq fight

for & l h .
Notwithstanding that the united front question played a big
role in the recent deieat of the "Old Guard" leadership the present
Socialist Party leaders, however, resist tbe striving of &c &unist Party for a general united front. Thus they rejected the Communist P a r =p r o p ~ ~for
l a joint communist Party ticket
in the 1936 national elections, Harking back to the traditional
Socialist Party owrtunist p o l i i of war against the Left md conciliation towards the Right, they work on the theory that joint action
with the Commuaists is a hindrance rather h an advantage. They
only go as far in the direction of the united front as they are p r e d
by their
rank and fik among whom the Communist Party
united f ronr policy is very popular. The official SociaIiPt Party stand is
against a general united front with the Communist Parry, but it
does d n a l I y accept united front d o n s on individual hues.
O n such questions as the Socialist Parrg and Communist Party
have developed united front dons, including the amalgamation of
the two unemployed organizations .into the Workers Alliance, the
defense of the Mwney, Sc-fo
and Herndon ascs, joint Socialist
Party-Communise Partg -'on
in various Imiw, l d mass demonstrations, etc., have h e n almwit uniformly highly successfd The

workers joy fully supported the unity in action of the two organizations, and the whole experience to date has gone to show that broad
united front activities by the t w o parties on a sound program couId

be a powerful factor for progress in the labor movement.
But Norman Thomas, with eyes Right, wants little or none of
that, In his latest book he says:
"Our fandamentar ta& is not to unite Maliaeq C o m m h and
what we EOU p-vM
y nruncrom enough ta ~ o faaeism,
p
i n a n e m t i - f d b k W of n s t D g c t b u a p c , s l a q t m f e ~ . ~ *

With such characteristic canfusionist arguments does T h o m a s
justify his appwtunist rejcEtion of the united front and place okacles
in the way of labor's unity. In one breath he admits that the prospective united front forces are "alrcady numerous enough to stop
fascism" b d then, in the very next breath, he bemoans that "All of
us tagether are, a h , too f ewi'.
Negative resuits of this Socialist Party mti-unitp line are to be
seen in various
front movemen- iacIudiDg the Farmer-Labor
Partg, the National Negro Congress, the N a W Youth Congress,
and the American League Against War and Fascism. In these movemene the S o d a h Pa* &cy
(save in the casc of individual !b
cialisb who disregard thcir Party's line) boils down prmp much to
one of mere fault-finding, scetarirrn prop& and even a d obslr~ction,The anti-united front tendencies in the Socialist Party arc
being saengthencd by the growing influence of the counter-revolu-

tionarv Tro&vitcs.
%mag &ho iP SO cimsemtivc on the united front crucstian in
the United states, puddedy becomes super-radical on the &ted front
internationally, which is only anothcr way of o@g
this $icy.
A la Trow, he is much alarmed that the PopuIar Front movements in Fmce and Spnrin are not revolutionary enough and he
criticizes them for Righi opportunism. Thus, characteristically, at a
big New York united front demonmation the k i d k t Party, in
the namt of vague prop& for a workers' Spain, not o d y refused
spe&dly to endorst the S p i s h People's Front government, which
was fighting guns in hand against fascism, but even tried to force
the Communist Party to agree not to W~JT
slagam or make speeches
bearing such endorrerncnts. But Thomas' narrow sectarian conccp

tion of the People's Front, a'fohwed in Europe, could only have the
effect of surrendtntng to the fascism the farmers and city middle
dass elements now in the Popular Front, for which dedsive gift
the f
d would rejoice. The Populgr Front movement, dtspitc iw
many weaknas yet in practice, is sound in principle. It is the
correct revoIutionary strategy in the given situation. It is the path
by whieh the anti-fascist masses can deveIap M
y the greatcat
possible struggle here and now, and it is a h the strate@
means
by which thc proletariat can gather around itself the maximum
forces for the eventual tlvolutionarp overthrow of the capitalist
system. It is giving new revolutionary hope, organidon snd fighting
spirit to the m a demoralized by the ideological bdmptcy of the
Second Internationd.
T h e Socialist Party's openly opportunist r&mmcc to the united
'front policy in the United States and its se&,
but no l
m oppoxtunkt, attempt to narrow down the People's Front in Europe is a h e
relation of thE "Old Guard's'' mti-united froat policy, and it is in
line kith that of the most reformist r&
of the Setond International. It demonstrates that the Socialist Party has not yet learned
how to develop the revolutionq farces, its new leadership not having
vanquished the reformist hang-overs from the past in this fun&m e n d respect. The anti-united front tendencies in the &idkt
Parry are a red barrier to its becoming a strong mass party and a
leading fighting force.
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In a previous chapter I bye &wn that one of the most f a d
mistakes in the whole hktory of the Sadeliw Party, one that undermiard the Party from within and alienated &e bst r e v o I u t i o ~
elements from without, was its yeamlong attitude of h&ty
towards
the U.S.S.R. The bitter struggle tbat the S&
Party "Old Guard''
petty-bourgeois leaders so long Icd against the first &&st
country
was a basic expression of their general war against the Left wing
in their own Party and against every other manifmtation of rwdutionary spirit and program.
The Sociakt Partp of t&yI despite its new turn, has not freed
imlf from this fundamental error. Such anqonisRl to the U.S.S.R.
is, in find analysis, antagonism t o p r o l e t a h revolution in general.
Although its rankad-file membefship are
IriendIy to the

Soviet Union, there still remains much of the old reformist andSovietism in the official policy of the Socialist Pa-. The SocirJirt Cdi,
fw example, has long been a happy hunting ground for renegades
like Zam, the Trotskyites and various other professional slanderers
of the U.S.S.R. Their lies are cut from the same cloth as those af
H~arstand Green, but often outdo the latter in insidious misrepresentation.
Norman Thomas, the decisive leader of the Socialist Party, is
especially to be criticized for his unfriendliness towards the Soviet
Union. His attitude regarding the U.S.S.R. or "Russia", as he calls
it in bourgeois fashion, is about I per cent grudging endorsement
and 99 per cent cynical criticism. It is not to be expected, of
course, that a reformist Socialist should accept uncritically the Soviet
government and is program, but he certainly should appraise it fairly
and honestly, and this Thomas does not do. The US.S.R. has always
welcomed sincere criticism, an example of this being the warm
greeting it gave to the recent splendid boolr by the Webbs, S o t k t
C o d : A hrew Ckdhio~rP,which contains no little, honest
but mistaken, criticism of the Soviet system.
Thomas approaches the question of the Soviet government from
a biased, antagonistic standpoint. Its gigantic achievements politically,
industrially, socially leave him cold and supeisridcal. He sneers at
the warm and loyal defense Communists make of the fim & a b
country, the great world stronghold against fascism, when he wys,
"Russia is a kind of holy h d to all Communists".* He ha never
taken the trouble to visit the U.S.S.R. (although thousands of Americans have done SO) to study the situation at first hand. Whenever
he writes about the Soviet Union Thomas reflects in his own special
way whatever anti-Soviet slanders happen to be afloat at the time,
Almost any liberal bourgeois writer can be depended upon to make
a fairer and more objective estimate than he of the Soviet Union.
In these crucial days of threatening war danger, with the Soviet
Union menaced from both east and west by strong and ruthless
fasckr powers, it is the duty and interest of every revolutionist to
draw cIoser to the U.S.S.R. and to give the r n d active support to its
peace policy. But Normm Thomas, typically, has not the slightest
sense of any such need. On the contrary, he seems to consider that
now, when the U.S.S.R. is so heavily attacked, i the best time to

L
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go w i g against it. His slanderow miwepresentation of tbe Soviet
Union during the Ethiopian war was a scandal. His reception of
the great new Soviet C o d t ~ t i o nwas frigid and s k e p t i c a h new
caphdh charter for New York City would evoke more enthusiasm
and faker consideration from him. His reaction to the case of the
TrowZinoviev terrorism was to put the Soviet government, not
t h a murderers, on trial. And so it goes on every Soviet question,
always Thomas ts to be found &*ng doubts and insinuations upan
the good faith of the Soviet government. He could gulp down without blinking the treacherous MaDonald and Bindenburg governments, but the revolutionary U.S.S.R. government can do nothing
to suit him. h d , as we have seen earlier, in his demand that '"Russia"
stand alone +st
its enemies and not d
l upon rhe workers of
&r countries for activc &ce,
he i threatening to abandon the
Soviet government altogether in case of war.
The revolutionary stam of a party can be measured by its
attitude towards the U.S.S.R. This is bemuse the Soviet government
is the revdution in life, the c r p d b t i o n in flesh and blood of reZutionq theory and practice. The anti-Soviet tendencies in the
leadership of the Soeirrlist Party are expressions of the reformism
with which the Party is dicttd. They are diluted "Old Guardism",
remnants of the traditional opportunk war +st
the Left wing,
and they are dangtroudy akin to Hearst's Sovietphobia. They sum
up as part of the Socialist Party's gene& failure to cultivate and
organize thc revolutioIuvg form.
It is high time that the Socialist Party put an end m these antirevdutionllrg trends. They have dom incalculable harm to the SoP w ever since the November, 1917, revolution and they
still continue to work their e d dm.The Socialist Party can never
be on a sound m a s basia until its leaders stop sniping at the U.S.S.R. ;
it can never become a revolutionary party until it gives, srs a Paw,
ro the Soviet government and b struggle for pee that heartg
support which springs sponhneowly in dl rcvoIutiolwy parties and
which we& up nawally in the h e m of every revolutionary worker.

T h P&spectiv4 of $he So&dir$ Par@
Now let us see to what general conelusions our analysis of the
hhory and present situarion of the S o d a h Party has led us.
Firstly, we have seen in Chapter I that the .basic reason why the

SoEialist Party has not succeeded historically in building i d f inta a
strong mass revoIutionary prty is bemuse it bas followed a poliey
of reformism instead of one of Marsian dags struggle. We have
also seed that this opportunist linc originated with the petty-bourgeois
intellectuaIs who dominated the S h I i s t Party and systematically
tried to make of it some kind of a ~emi-demi-progrcasive patty.
Then, in Cbaptcn XI and XI, we have sten concretely bow the
Socialist Pslrtg, in the W - o d d years prior to the development of
its new Left turn iu 1934, had continuody violated both major
essentials of the necessary &is struggle policy: ( a ) by its fdme to
corns forward militantly as the leader of the toiling masses in their
dady emnomic and political q g k s , and, (b) by its faiiure to build
up a solid body of Mamian understanding in the Socialist Party and
among its uma following. And we have also seen how, step by step,
this persistent reformist plicy prevented the Sodalist Party from
growing and gaining broad mass influence and how it finally led
to several splits and to the deep decay which the Party suffered for
ten ycarsprior to 1934.
Now, in Chapter IV, we have just checked owr the present genera1 line and condition of the Swialist Party to learn whether, since
its 1934 turn Leftwards, the Party hasovercome the reformist errors
of its past and has hid the basis for a m u d M-an
policy of dass
struggle, And the conclusion we are compelled to arrive at is a
negative one. The old disease of opportunism still
the Socialist
Party, although it has taken on some new sectarian forms.
T o begin with, the prtscnt day SociaIist Party has not succeeded
in proletarianizing its leadership, d t h ~ u g hit has freed imlf of many
opportunist doctors, lawyers, profemrs, etc., in the "Old Guard"
split. As since its beginning, the Social& Party leadership remains in
the hands of the petty-bourgeois intellechmk And the general tendency of these &cials goes to thwart the revolutionsry p u r e of
the proletarians in the Party and to keep the Party on a reformist
course, masked by revolutionary ~hrasemakingand Trotskyist countersvolutionary mmtuverings.
We have a h seen in the present chapter how the present Socialist Party leademhip still violates the two major essentials of the
indispensable Mamian class struggle policy. Firstly, by its perpetuation
of old reformist hang-ovtrs and the introduction of the new sectarian opportunism, illustrated through its grossly wrong attitude on
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tbe q l l c ~ of
h thc relation of the fight for imme&& demands to
dght for socialism, its defeatist attitude in the struggle a g a h fascism
and war, i@ anti-Labor Party plicy, ttc., this leadcrshi prevents
the Socklist Party from coming forward in a leading role in the
p
st~uggle~
of the workers and thus condemns the Party
' dtodblatbn
and impotence; and, secondly, by its grw neglect, rc'
visionism, and antagonkin towards the theoretid works of Man,
Engels, Lenin and Stalin, by its M t y to the united front policy,
by its ~ 0 1 ~ ~ 0 l i d a t iwkh
O n the discredited T r o w dhpters, and
by its unfriindlineas towards the Soviet Union, the SoJalist Party
leadership binders the growth of the class conscious body of rewlu! tIonarg fighters without whom the S a d k Party a n never succeed.
The general consequence of this fdure of the new Socialist
., Party leademhip to comet the M o n a l and d k & o u reformiet
;'
liac of the Party h a hen, inseead of liquidating che Partg crisis, to
intensify it, especlalIy during the p
t year. The !hdhParty is very
dct from opporhulim and T h d new t'curcn t as bad as the old
' h:indeed it is only tbt chronic ailment of reformism manifdng
itself through new symptom. Thc Sodalist P q d s k spreads,
dacpens and becomes more threatening. The Party membership ia
r a g y d&ng,
now being probably not more than half of the
19,121 tbat it was Iast pear. The "OId Gwd" split has wrought
h a m with the Party organhion in Ohio, I n k , California,
'
Washiugton, Oregon, New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, ctc.,
and the P
w is threatening to colIapse in m a n y other l d t i e s .
The effects of the split are made worse by Thomas' silly aeetatian
palicks and the anti-revolutionarp work of the Trotskyist eIements,
. all 6f which drive away many serious and honest workers, The
. $xidist Party is torn with factionalism, with half a dozen group
struggling for leadership; the Party is deeply confused theoretidy;
5. dkjpline is practically non-existent; pesimism is r a m p t , and t h m is
a general falling away of members who are d&grunded and dis@wed. Naturally also, the maas hflutnce of the Sociakt Party has
rapidly waned; its 1936 election vote will be greatly reduced md,
a c m e , in the trade union$ even those led by b d h for many
years, it bas been almm wiped out.* In short, the Socialist Party
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hidk Party controlled d o n , the b d a h
-ahti-LaborPattypoZicyw~rtj&byavotthhrptio
of 15 to 1.
typm example:

30,000 membtrq a d t i o n d p

is now, as the fruit of its long-eontinutd oppammh policies, in a
most serious Crhk
Now as to the future: Is the S o c k k t Party on the way to collapse, or b it within it the possiy of a r e ~ h a n c eand growth
into s strong party of real value in devclophg the fighting fore of
the proletariat and its allies? T o this query the only answer that can
correctly be given a t present is that both positive and negative factors
are at work in shaping the Socialist Party and that the fate of the
Party depends upon which of these forces becomes definitely
dominant.
Among the positive faaon-that is, those making for a strong
and revolutionary Socialist Party--the most basic one is the constant
pressure npon the Socialist Party from the mdidzarion of the
masses of workers. Faced by the surging capidkt reaction which increasingly tends in the direction of fascism, these masses, hatlrssed by
unemployment, low wages, abridged civil rights, ctc., are compelled
to fight. Hence, they press militantly upon the trade unions, the
growing Farmer-Labor P q , and aIl other labor orgmimtims, in
order to utilize these Mies as fighting w e a n s in their growing
struggle against thc capitalist exploiters. It was this mass pressure,
in first line, that brought about the Leftward trend in the Socialist:
Party, with its defeat of the "Old Guard", adoption of the Detroit,
1934, declaration of principles, ttc., and it is this force which, in
opposition to the present t p d of the Socialist Party leadership, pr*
vides the general basis for the defeat of sectarian reformism and
Trotskyism in the S o & h Party.
Dovetailing with t
h constmCtiye force are the effects, on the
one hand, of the open bankruptcy of the ref ormist, elass collaboration policy of the whole Second International in the face of rising
fascism and, on the other hand, of the gseat successes, domestic and
foreign, of the Socialist Soviet Union, the growth of the Popular
Front movements in Spain, France, and the general united front
palicy of the Communist Internationd-11
of which developments
tend to press the Sodist Party in the direction of a policy of M
h
class struggle.
Another major @tive force making for a fighting Socialist
Party is the revolutionary example and stimulation of the Communist
Party. The C.P.U.S.A. manifestly has every reason to want the
!bcdist Party to dewlop in a revoIutionary sense, for this means
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greatly to increase the power of both parties and to draw them
clwr together. Therefore, the Communist Party cooperates with
the Socialist Party wherever psible, meanwhile making and receiving
d d s m in a friendly spirit. T h e Communist Party does what it mn
to sbcngthen the Leninist bent. within .the Wt Party; it
seizes upon evey practical occasion to initiate joint united front campaigns of the two parties and other labor groups; its whole porky
looh forward to the eventual amalgamati011 of the Communist
Pilrtg and S d i s t Party into one party upon the bask of a Leninist
revdutionary program,
But there are also at work powerful negative forces that check
thew constructive e1ements and tend to push the Socialist Party
deeper into the quicksand of oppormnb. Among these negative
forces is the important fact that the Socdist Party has not succeeded
in prolemrianizing its leadership. At the Pattg's head, as of yore,
smds a group of opportunist petty-bourgeois intellectuals. These
elements act as s real M e r to the manslation of the revolutiomy
m o d of the S o d k t Party's proletarian members into terms of a
M d - M i n i s t p l i c y fop rhc Party.
Next there is the negative force of the traditional reformist line
of the Socialkt Party. The dfftrucdve oppotunist policies which, as
we have seen in detail, have through the course of the years brought
the Socialist Party to the bnirk of ruin, still remain basidly h effect.
Their new seetarisn trimm'mgs by no means mitigate their disastrous
consequences upon the Party.
And then there i9 that new mahgnant disease of the Socialist
Party, the plague of Trotskpism. The admission of the counterrevolutionary Trotskyites was an injection of deadly poison into rhe
life tissues of tbe Socialist P q . They are not only wotsenmg every
traditional weakness of the Party but are ia~odudnga whole series
of new difficulties for it.
Of rhese posl0tiveand negative farces, of which f have cited only
those of a major charattcr, it must be admitted that the negative
ones are now in the ascendant. Corroding and destructive, they are
rapdy isolating the Socialist Party from the masses and disintegrating
its organization. It is certain tbat with iss present leadership and
the S o d k t Party is on the way to impotence. Unless both
arc &ngcd, unless the forces that produced the 1934 Left turn
md overthrew tho "Old Guard" can go forward to their necessary

I

goal by giving the Socialist Party a revolutionary leadership and
policy, the Socialist Parzp's dxpg as an important factarcin tbt labor
movement are over. In their time both the S o d k t LJOT
Party and
the Indusuial Workers of the World were militant organi&ms
that played a progressive mlc in the developing revolutionary movement. But they failed to learn the Iessons of the class struggle of

their period and did not adapt themselves m the c h g i n g fighting needs of the workers. So they became isolated from the advancing
ml#iscs and fell into de&e
and seaarian mummification. b the
Socialist Party dmmed to travel the same f a t d path?
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